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ESSAYS ON DYNAMIC PRICING AND BUNDLING IN SUBSCRIPTION MARKETS 
Nabita Penmetsa, PhD 
University of Pittsburgh, 2014 
This dissertation consists of two essays that investigate dynamic pricing and bundling strategies in 
subscription markets. In the first essay, we analyze the dynamic price discrimination strategies of a 
monopolist offering new services on a subscription basis. In subscription markets, the pricing policy can 
be based on customers’ past purchase behavior (behavioral price discrimination) and time of purchase 
(intertemporal price discrimination). In the presence of uncertainty regarding the value of new features 
and heterogeneity in consumer valuations of the existing features, we investigate the profits and rate of 
adoption of new technology that can be achieved with each pricing strategy. When the prior heterogeneity 
in consumer valuation of the existing features is relatively large, the monopolist can improve his profits 
by committing to ignore consumer past behavior and varying prices based only on time. We also study 
the role of commitment power of the monopolist to announce future prices and correlation in valuations 
of the new and existing features.  
In the second essay, we investigate the multi-product pricing strategies of a sequentially innovating 
monopolist introducing new services. The new service can either represent a new functionality not 
directly related to the existing service or an enhancement to the existing services. When the existing 
service is offered in multiple versions, the monopolist can sell the new service separately or bundle the 
new service with some or all versions of the primary service. We analyze two pricing strategies that 
represent the two extremes of a spectrum of bundling strategies that a monopolist offering such services 
can practice: Discriminative Bundling (DB) and Independent Pricing (IP).  Using the discriminative 
bundling (DB) strategy, a service provider offering multiple versions of the primary service bundles the 
new service only with higher versions of the primary service while selling it separately to remaining 
customers. Using the independent pricing strategy (IP), the service provider offers the new service 
separately to all consumers including those buying lower and higher end versions. We find that the 
comparison of the two strategies in terms of profits depends on the nature of the new service and the 
general distribution of consumer valuations for the new and the primary services.  
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1 GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
	  
 
Cloud computing is transforming the way software is delivered and priced. Software companies are 
moving away from the traditional model of selling boxed software for a fixed price to delivering software 
as a service for a recurring subscription fee. The existing pricing literature treats software as an 
experience good. However, the move to a subscription model represents a unique opportunity to analyze 
the pricing of an experience good in a repeat purchase setting. In the first essay, we analyze the dynamic 
price discrimination strategies of a monopolist offering new services on a subscription basis. Access to 
customer subscription history allows the monopolist to design pricing policies that can be based on 
customers’ past purchase behavior and the time of purchase. Uncertainty regarding the value of new 
features and heterogeneity in consumer valuation of the existing features creates intertemporal incentives 
that influence profits and the rate of adoption of new technology. We find that the comparison of pricing 
regimes critically depends on whether or not the monopolist finds it optimal to encourage all consumers 
to adopt the new technology early. They differ only when the prior heterogeneity in consumer valuation 
of the existing features is relatively large, in which case the monopolist finds it optimal to serve only part 
of the population of consumers having relatively high valuation. The monopolist can improve his profits 
by committing to ignore consumer past behavior and varying prices based only on time. Moreover, if a 
stronger commitment to never utilize any price discrimination is feasible, the profits of the monopolist are 
even higher. We also investigate the effect of positive correlation between the consumer valuations of the 
existing and new features of the technology. We find that as correlation increases, the gap in profits of the 
various regimes narrows while the ranking remains the same. In particular, with perfect correlation all 
time inconsistency issues that arise due to lack of commitment disappear completely with all regimes, and 
the “First Best” outcome is attainable.  
In the second essay, we investigate the pricing strategies of a monopolist using more than one 
form of price discrimination mechanism. Specifically, we analyze the pricing strategies of a monopolist 
offering multiple versions of a primary service and investing in new services. When introducing new 
services, the monopolist can sell the new service separately or bundle the new service with some or all 
versions of the primary service. We focus on two pricing strategies that represent the two extremes of the 
various types of bundling that a monopolist offering such services can practice: Discriminative Bundling 
(DB) and Independent Pricing (IP).  Using the discriminative bundling (DB) strategy, a service provider 
offering multiple versions of the primary service bundles the new service only with higher versions of the 
primary service and sells the new service separately to remaining customers. Using the independent 
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pricing strategy (IP), the service provider offers the new service separately to all consumers including 
those buying lower and higher end versions. We find that the comparison of the two strategies in terms of 
profits depends on the nature of the new service and the general distribution of consumer valuations for 
the new and the primary services. When the new service represents an enhancement to the primary 
service, consumer valuations for the new service are correlated with their valuations for the primary 
service. In such cases, a discriminative bundling strategy always leads to lower profits when compared to 
independent pricing. When the new service represents a service extension that is unrelated to the primary 
service, consumer valuations for the new service are independent of their valuations for the primary 
service. In addition to the correlation between consumer valuations for the new and the primary service, 
the nature of the relationship between the new and the primary service can also influence the comparison 
of pricing strategies. When there is a difference in the value derived from using the new service with and 
without the premium version, discriminative bundling can lead to higher profits when compared to the 
independent pricing strategy when customer heterogeneity for the primary service is sufficiently large and 
the degree of complementarity or substitutability is sufficiently high.  
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2 ESSAY 1: DYNAMIC PRICING OF SERVICE UPGRADES IN 
SUBSCRIPTION MARKETS 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
The introduction of subscription services in the software industry is disrupting the traditional 
model of selling software for a one-time fixed payment. Microsoft and Adobe, for instance, have started 
offering their new version of Office and Creative Suite software, respectively, on a subscription basis. A 
subscription model differs from the traditional model in two important ways. First, in a subscription 
environment consumers are required to renew their subscription after every period in order to continue 
using the software. Second, subscriptions allow a service provider to more successfully collect and 
maintain customer data. This information can be used, for instance, to identify whether a user is a first 
time customer or a returning customer who is in the market for renewal.  The service provider can use this 
information to design pricing strategies that are based on the time of purchase (vary the subscription price 
over time) and the customer’s purchase history (offer different prices to new and returning customers), 
thus giving rise to three possible price discrimination regimes: (i) Behavioral price discrimination (B) 
where the seller can offer different prices to new and experienced customers, (ii) Intertemporal price 
discrimination (I) where the seller can vary prices based only on time, and (iii) Behavioral and 
Intertemporal price discrimination combined (BI), where the seller can vary prices based upon both 
behavior and time.  
There exists wide variation in the way technology companies are pricing their subscriptions of 
new software. Adobe, for instance, offers introductory discounts on the subscription of Creative Cloud to 
academic users and existing users of CS6 software.  Similarly, Intuit offers introductory discounts to new 
customers on subscriptions of Quickbooks Online and Quickbooks Accountant. The introductory 
discounts are valid only for one subscription period and returning customers who want to renew their 
subscriptions are required to pay the then market price of the software, which tends to be higher than the 
introductory price. In contrast, some firms stay away from such introductory offers that favor new 
customers over returning customers. For example, Microsoft does not offer any special discounts to new 
customers on the subscription of Office 365. However, most of these firms mention in their offer that the 
current price of the subscription is valid only for a limited period of time and is subject to change, 
indicating that the firms wish to preserve their flexibility to vary prices in the future. Although the 
existing literature presents some insights on the relative profitability of such pricing strategies (see, for 
instance, Fudenberg et al. (2006) and Jing (2011)) there still exists incomplete understanding of the 
intertemporal incentives of firms and consumers in an environment where consumers gain information 
about a new technology from their experience of using it. In particular, the literature has not considered 
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how the growth prospects of the market or the extent of uncertainty facing the consumer affect the 
comparison among the various pricing regimes.  
Our objective is to close this gap in the literature by focusing on the pricing of a new service in a 
subscription environment with forward-looking consumers who are uncertain of their valuation of the 
new service. New software such as Adobe Creative Cloud can be considered a bundle of new and existing 
features. While consumers are familiar with the existing features of the software, they face significant 
uncertainty with respect to the value of the new features. Consumers who buy the service gain experience 
with the new features and use the information gathered in making future purchasing decisions.  
Contingent upon the pricing strategy of the firm, consumers can strategically decide also on the timing of 
their first subscription to the new service. In particular, they can choose between subscribing to the 
service immediately and postponing their subscription to a later date, if they expect prices to decline over 
time. Postponing the subscription prevents them, however, from experimenting with the new features and 
assessing their added value.   Whether this added information influences their future behavior depends 
upon their valuation of the existing features. Consumers with very high valuation for the existing features 
may renew their subscription even if their valuation of the new features is relatively low. For instance, 
professional web designers who tend to have relatively high valuation for Adobe’s creative applications 
may renew their subscription to Creative Cloud even if they find that the quality of the new applications 
is not impressive.  
We explore how the different pricing regimes affect the profitability of a monopolistic firm, the 
extent of market coverage, and the pattern of prices over time when the monopolist does not have the 
power to commit to future prices. Given that in subscription markets the firm can observe past behavior of 
its customers and can also change prices as time elapses, in order to implement a pricing regime that 
excludes either past behavior or time or both variables, it is necessary for the firm to utilize a commitment 
device that prohibits it from using some or all of the observable variables at its disposal. In the absence of 
such commitment devices, the monopolist will utilize both behavior and time in designing its pricing 
policy. We also derive the equilibrium when the monopolist has full commitment power to credibly 
announce future prices to new and returning customers.  We use this full commitment case as a 
benchmark to illustrate the characteristics of the “First Best” outcome that ensures the highest profits for 
the monopolist. Under the “First Best”, the monopolist rewards the loyalty of returning customers by 
charging them lower prices, and also commits to never cutting prices to new customers in future periods.  
We compare the various pricing regimes without commitment against this “First Best” benchmark and 
demonstrate that this comparison critically depends upon the extent of coverage of the market and the 
overall uncertainty facing the consumers regarding their valuation of the new features.  
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We start by analyzing the pricing regimes when the market is less than fully covered, implying 
that there is always a segment of consumers who have not experienced as of yet the new service.  This 
regime arises in our model if the heterogeneity in consumer valuations of the existing features of the 
service is sufficiently large. We demonstrate that in such growing markets, if the monopolist has the 
flexibility to choose among the three price discrimination regimes, his profits are highest if only time and 
not past behavior is utilized in pricing. This regime of intertemporal price discrimination is characterized 
by a declining schedule of prices over time as the monopolist seeks to expand his market by making his 
service more affordable to low valuation consumers. In contrast to this declining schedule of prices, when 
only behavior is used as a basis for discrimination, the monopolist charges returning customers higher 
prices than new customers. Given their choice to subscribe to the new service a second time, returning 
customers implicitly reveal that their valuation of the service is relatively high, thus providing an 
incentive for the monopolist to charge them a higher price. Even though the regime of behavioral price 
discrimination is less profitable for the monopolist than intertemporal price discrimination, it does 
encourage a bigger number of consumers to adopt the new technology early because of the low 
introductory prices that the monopolist charges in this case. We also find that utilizing both behavior and 
time as bases for discrimination has the most adverse effect on the profits of the monopolist. Anticipation 
of an increase in prices to experienced customers makes learning less attractive for consumers and 
anticipation of a decrease in prices to new customers in the future encourages more consumers to 
postpone their purchase to a later period. We further demonstrate that if the monopolist has stronger 
commitment powers that permit him to commit to a constant price irrespective of the period of purchase 
or the purchase history of the consumer, his profits are even higher than with any price discrimination 
regime, including that of intertemporal price discrimination.  
We continue by analyzing the pricing regimes when the market is fully covered, namely when the 
entire customer base adopts the new service early and the potential for further growth disappears. In our 
model this regime arises when the extent of heterogeneity in the consumer valuation of the existing 
features of the service is relatively small. Because all consumers adopt the new technology early, the 
monopolist does not have an incentive to cut prices to new customers in later periods in order to expand 
his market. Moreover, customers in later periods are all returning customers and the distinction between 
new and returning customers disappears. As a result, all pricing regimes yield identical profits and 
patterns of prices over time. Specifically, prices rise over time under either behavioral or intertemporal 
price discrimination, as repeat purchases by consumers signal to the monopolist that returning customers 
have high valuation for the product. Recall, that this trend of prices contradicts the trend under the “First 
Best” where loyalty is rewarded in the form of lower prices. As a result, in the absence of commitment 
power the monopolist still cannot achieve the “First Best” outcome even when the market is fully 
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covered. It is noteworthy that the environment and results we obtain with full market coverage resemble 
that derived in Jing (2011).  
Finally, we analyze the effect of correlation between the valuations of the new and existing 
features on the comparison among the different pricing regimes. In the presence of correlation, the 
consumer’s familiarity with her valuation of the basic features helps her resolve some of the uncertainty 
regarding her valuation of the new features, and the importance of consumer learning declines.  We find 
that as the degree of correlation increases, while the ranking of the various pricing schemes remains as in 
the case of no correlation, the difference in profitability between the best and worst performing pricing 
regimes diminishes. The difference disappears completely in the extreme case, when the basic and new 
valuations are perfectly correlated, and therefore, the consumer faces no uncertainty. We find that with 
perfect correlation all pricing regimes are equivalent and yield the “First Best” outcome, even when the 
monopolist does not have commitment power to set future prices. It is interesting that this result is similar 
to that derived in the Durable Good Monopolist literature (Coase (1972) and Bulow (1983)), where it has 
been demonstrated that by leasing instead of selling the product the monopolist can overcome all time 
inconsistency issues that arise due to his lack of commitment power. Like in the case of perfect 
correlation in our model, the Durable Good Monopoly literature focuses on an environment where 
consumers face no uncertainty regarding their preferences.  
 
2.2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
Our work is primarily related to two streams of literature: dynamic pricing of experience goods and 
behavior based price discrimination. Nelson (1970) was the first to introduce the concept of an experience 
good. When buying such a good consumers are initially uncertain of their valuation of the product, but 
gain information about this valuation after purchasing and using the product. An early study that derives 
the implications of such consumer learning on the path of pricing chosen by the firm is Shapiro (1983). 
Subsequent studies in this area have focused on deriving the optimal pricing path with strategic 
consumers and heterogeneity in consumer population in terms of experience with the good (Cremer 1984) 
and rate of learning (Bergemann and Välimäki (2006)). While these studies focus on a monopoly setting, 
Villas-Boas (2004, 2006) considers learning in a competitive environment. He demonstrates that the 
pricing path and the profitability of each firm depend on the extent of negative or positive skewness of the 
distribution function of consumer valuations.  
In subscription markets, the identity of buyers is not anonymous and service providers can 
distinguish between new and repeat customers. As a result, providers can price discriminate between new 
and existing customers. Behavior based price discrimination has been addressed in the literature both in 
monopolistic and competitive settings. Fudenberg et al. (2006) provides a comprehensive review of the 
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literature in this area. Studies that investigate the role of behavior based price discrimination in 
competitive markets focus primarily on the ability of a firm to poach the customers of its competitors by 
offering them better deals than those offered to the existing customers of the firm. In some of these 
studies the driving force in enticing customers to switch relates to the existence of switching costs (see for 
instance, Chen (1997), Shaffer and Zhang (2000), and Taylor (2003)). In other studies enticing customers 
relates to horizontal product differentiation among competitors (see, for instance, Chen and Pearcy 
(2010), Fudenberg and Tirole (2000), Pazgal and Soberman (2008), Shin and Sudhir (2010) and Villas-
Boas (1999)).  
At the intersection of the above two streams, Caminal (2012), Cremer (1984) and Jing (2011) 
analyze behavior based price discrimination in a monopoly setting when consumers are uncertain of their 
valuation of the new product and experience with the product reduces this uncertainty. Caminal (2012) 
and Cremer (1984) analyze the optimality of coupons and loyalty programs that reward returning 
customers over new customers. They assume that the monopolist has the power to commit to future 
prices. In contrast, similar to us, Jing (2011) evaluates time contingent pricing and behavior based price 
discrimination when the monopolist does not have the power to commit to future prices. 
As in the experience good pricing literature, Jing (2011) assumes that consumers are completely 
uninformed of their valuations prior to gaining experience with the new product and are, therefore, 
identical prior to purchasing the good for the first time. The price chosen by the monopolist leads to either 
none or all of the consumers buying the service in an early period. Because it is optimal for the 
monopolist to induce the entire population of consumers to start experimenting with the product early, in 
later periods all consumers are returning customers. In a given period, therefore, the monopolist faces 
either all new or all returning customers and the distinction between new or returning customers in a 
given period disappears. In contrast to this setting, we assume that consumers are heterogeneous even 
before they learn their idiosyncratic valuations of the new features of the service. We find that when this 
initial heterogeneity is relatively high, it is optimal for the monopolist to sell only to a segment of the 
population with sufficiently high valuation of the basic service. Because part of the market remains 
uncovered, in later periods the monopolist is tempted to cut his price to new customers in order to expand 
his market, thus giving rise to price discrimination based on time.  Such incentives do not arise in Jing 
(2011) where the entire population of consumers is attracted right away. It is noteworthy that our 
environment becomes identical to that modeled in this previous paper when the extent of prior 
heterogeneity among consumers is relatively small and the monopolist finds it optimal to cover the entire 
market right away. As a result, we obtain the same results as Jing in this case. Specifically, any form of 
price discrimination (behavioral or intertemporal) yields identical profits for the monopolist. 
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Another stream of literature that is related to our environment is that of dynamic product design 
when firms do not have commitment power (see, for instance, Dhebar (1994), Fudenberg and Tirole 
(1998), Kornish (2001), Krishnan and Ramachandran (2011), and Sankaranarayanan (2007)). These 
papers all assume a durable good monopolist that can offer technological improvements or upgrades to 
the product in the future. The monopolist cannot commit, however, to the extent of improvement or the 
future price of the product. The lack of commitment to future prices that we assume in our paper is 
extended in this stream of literature to include also lack of commitment power regarding the quality of the 
product in the future.  
 
2.3 MODEL AND PRELIMINARIES 
A monopolist is offering a new service that consists of some new and existing features, on a subscription 
basis. Consumers have heterogeneous valuations for the existing features of the service. We designate this 
heterogeneity by a parameter 𝜃 which is uniformly distributed in the population over the interval 0, 𝜃! . 
While each consumer knows her own valuation of the existing version, the monopolist is only familiar 
with the distribution of this valuation in the population. We designate the value of new features by a 
parameter q. The valuation of the new features is unknown to both the monopolist and the consumers. 
However, consumers can learn their valuation of the new features after using the new version for one 
subscription cycle. The realization of this value to the consumer varies across different consumers. For 
example, Adobe Creative Cloud includes a new web development tool called Muse. Customer reviews 
indicate that some users who tried the new tool value the new feature highly due to ease of use but some 
users were unhappy about the speed and performance aspects of the tool1.  We assume that the 
distribution of this value is uniform over the interval [0,  𝑞!]. The reservation price of a consumer of type 𝜃 for the new service is 𝜃 + 𝑞. We assume that q and 𝜃 are independently distributed, and that the 
distributions of these variables in the population are common knowledge. We also assume that the 
marginal cost of providing the new version is negligible. This is a valid assumption for many software 
products for which most of the costs are fixed in nature and relate to the cost of developing the product. 
We consider a two-period model where in each period the monopolist has to make pricing decisions. The 
two-period assumption is justified given that the lifecycle of software tends to be rather limited, as it is 
often replaced by totally new products or because the hardware on which it is installed becomes obsolete. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  Customer	  reviews	  of	  the	  Adobe	  Creative	  Cloud	  membership	  on	  the	  Amazon	  website	  vary	  tremendously.	  Of	  43	  
reviews	  published	  on	  February	  12,	  2014,	  19	  gave	  it	  5	  stars	  and	  11	  gave	  it	  only	  1	  star.	  See	  all	  reviews	  at	  the	  link	  
http://www.amazon.com/Adobe-­‐Creative-­‐Membership-­‐Pre-­‐Paid-­‐Product/product-­‐reviews/B007W76ZLW	  A	  similar	  
spread	  in	  evaluation	  exists	  also	  on	  the	  Adobe	  website	  
http://www.adobe.com/products/creativecloud/reviews.html	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We consider an environment where the monopolist cannot credibly commit to future prices. As a 
result, under behavioral price discrimination he cannot credibly commit to the price returning customers 
will face in the future. Similarly, under intertemporal price discrimination or the combined intertemporal 
and behavioral price discrimination he cannot commit to future prices any type of customer (old or new) 
will face. In the absence of commitment power, the monopolist chooses future prices when the future 
arrives. It is noteworthy that the regimes of exclusively behavioral or exclusively intertemporal price 
discrimination (regimes B or I) correspond to environments where the monopolist does have some 
commitment power. With behavioral price discrimination the monopolist can utilize a mechanism to 
credibly communicate to new customers that he will never charge lower prices to other new customers in 
the future. An example of such a mechanism is to offer new customers a refund if prices are ever lowered 
to other new customers in the future. Similarly, with intertemporal price discrimination the monopolist 
possesses a credible way of convincing customers that their level of experience with the new service does 
not affect the prices they will face in the future. This being the case in spite of the fact that the monopolist 
can identify consumer’s past behavior based upon their subscription history. Using contemporaneous 
Most Favored Customer clauses (Cooper (1986)) that promise to reimburse customers if any other 
customer is offered a lower price in a given period may offer a vehicle to implement this type of partial 
price discrimination regime. The bi-dimensional price discrimination regime BI does not require any 
commitment power on the part of the monopolist. In this case the monopolist does not preclude himself 
from incorporating in his pricing any available information about either the past subscription history of 
the customer or the period of time when the service is purchased. Regardless of the regime considered we 
assume that the monopolist cannot commit at the present to prices he will charge in the future. In the 
absence of such commitment power, we will derive the equilibrium by backward induction. 
In the first period the monopolist sells the new version to consumers who have no experience 
with the new features. In the second period the monopolist faces two groups of consumers: (i) New 
consumers who still have no experience with the new service and (ii) Repeat consumers who bought the 
new service in period 1 and have, therefore, experience using the new features. Depending on the form of 
price discrimination regime used by the monopolist, the price of the service in the second period may be 
different for new and returning consumers. In the most general case i.e., the BI regime, the monopolist 
can choose three different prices: an introductory price 𝑃!! in the first period for all consumers, a price 
for new consumers in the second period 𝑃!!, and a price for returning consumers in the second 
period  𝑃!!. However, in the B and I regimes which are characterized by only one form of price 
discrimination, the choice of the monopolist is reduced to only two prices. For example, in the B regime, 
the price to new customers remains the same in the second period 𝑃!! = 𝑃!!!  𝑃!, therefore, the 
monopolist chooses a price   𝑃! in the first period and a price 𝑃! for returning customers in the second 
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period. Similarly, in the I regime, since new and returning customer are offered the same price in the 
second period 𝑃!! = 𝑃!! = 𝑃!, and the choice of the monopolist is reduced to only two prices 𝑃! and 𝑃!. 
We describe our modelling approach by focusing on the case of price discrimination based on both time 
and behavior (BI Regime). We use a similar approach to obtain the equilibrium with the uni-dimensional 
price discrimination regimes by imposing the additional constraints,   𝑃!! =   𝑃!! =   𝑃! in the B regime 
and   𝑃!! =   𝑃!! =   𝑃! in the I regime. 
Focusing on the BI regime we start by considering the consumer’s choice. When deciding on 
whether to buy the new version in the first period consumers are forward looking and try to assess their 
expected utility over both periods. Each consumer knows her valuation parameter 𝜃 right from the start. 
However, because the valuation of the new features is unknown in the first period, all consumers use the 
prior distribution to calculate its mean as !!!  . In the second period, consumers who bought the new 
version in the first period learn the realization of q and decide on whether to continue buying the new 
version or not. In particular, if the realization of q is relatively low the consumer may decide not to buy 
the service in the second period. For high realizations of q, however, consumers will continue to buy the 
service. Consumers who did not buy the new version in the first period are still uncertain of the value q in 
the second period as well, and continue to use the mean of the prior distribution of q in assessing the 
average value of the added features. Since the utility derived from the existing version in each period is 𝜃, 
a consumer of type 𝜃 assesses her net surplus in the first period when buying the subscription as !!! + 𝜃 − 𝑃!!  . The evaluation of the second period net surplus depends on whether or not the consumer 
purchased the new version in the first period. For those who bought the new version in the first period, the 
net surplus when buying it a second time is given by 𝑞 + 𝜃 − 𝑃!!. Note that an informed consumer will 
continue to buy the service in the second period only if 𝑞 > (𝑃!! − 𝜃). Because consumers are forward 
looking, in calculating their aggregate expected utility over both periods they take into account the 
possibility that they may not continue to buy the service in the second period even if they choose to 
purchase it in the first period.  For those who did not buy the new product in the first period, the net 
surplus in period 2 is given by 𝑀𝑎𝑥 𝜃 + !!! − 𝑃!!  , 0 . Ignoring discounting of future payoffs in the 
aggregation, a consumer of type 𝜃 receives the following expected utilities from buying and not buying 
the new service in period 1. 
 𝐸𝑈 𝜃|𝐵𝑢𝑦  𝑖𝑛  𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑  1 =      !!! + 𝜃 − 𝑃!! + !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 𝑑𝑞 + !!!!!!!!! 𝑑𝑞.                                (1) 𝐸𝑈 𝜃|𝑁𝑜𝑡  𝑏𝑢𝑦  𝑖𝑛  𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑  1 = 0 +𝑀𝑎𝑥{  !!! + 𝜃 − 𝑃!! , 0}.                                                                 (2) 
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Note that a consumer who did not buy the new version in the first period may face a new price 𝑃!! if she 
considers buying it in the second period. However, only if 𝑃!! < 𝑃!!, a consumer will find it optimal to 
postpone the purchase to the second period. From (1) and (2) it follows that if 𝑃!! ≥ 𝑃!! any consumer 
who chooses to buy the new version will do so in the first stage. As noted earlier, the two integral 
expressions in (1) reflect the idea that when anticipating the expected utility derived in the second period, 
strategic consumers know that they will be able to incorporate information obtained as a result of their 
purchasing decision in the first period. In the B regime, the monopolist does not vary prices over time and 
charges new customers the same price that he charged in the first period (𝑃!! = 𝑃!!). Therefore, for a 
consumer who did not buy the new service in the first period, the net surplus in period 2 is equal to zero. 
Because we consider a growing market that is far from reaching saturation, we assume that in 
both periods there is a group of consumers with no experience of using the new version. Hence, the 
market is less than fully covered in each period, and in the second period the population of consumers can 
be divided into two segments: experienced and inexperienced consumers. To identify these two segments, 
we have to solve for the consumer of type 𝜃∗ who is indifferent between buying and not buying in period 
1, namely a consumer who satisfies the equation   𝐸𝑈 𝜃∗|𝐵𝑢𝑦  𝑖𝑛  𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑  1 = 𝐸𝑈 𝜃∗|𝑁𝑜𝑡  𝑏𝑢𝑦  𝑖𝑛  𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑  1 . Because the added benefit of buying is 
increasing in  𝜃 all consumers of type 𝜃 < 𝜃∗ will not buy the new service in the first period and all 
consumers of type 𝜃 > 𝜃∗ will buy it in the first period. 
Recall that we consider an environment where the monopolist cannot credibly commit to the 
future price he will charge any type of customer. Instead, he optimally chooses the price new and 
returning customers pay when the future arrives. Consistent with this assumption, we solve the game by 
backward induction starting by characterizing the equilibrium of the second stage. Such an approach 
guarantees that the strategies chosen in the second stage are credible (such strategies have been referred to 
in the literature as close-loop strategies.) Adobe and Intuit, for instance, offer trial agreements to new 
customers without committing to future prices once the agreements expire. Our modeling approach is 
consistent with this reality. 
In the second stage, the monopolist can observe the size of the segment of consumers who bought 
the new version in the first stage,  𝜃! − 𝜃∗, and potentially may continue to do so in the second stage. 
Note that the monopolist takes the size of this segment as given at the beginning of the second stage. In 
particular, his choice of 𝑃!! cannot change the size of the segment of experienced buyers who consider 
buying the service again. However, the price that the monopolist charges returning customers determines 
who in the region 𝜃∗, 𝜃!  will continue to buy the service, and under what circumstances. In particular, 
the second period price determines whether the repeat purchase decision of a returning customer is 
conditional on her experience with the new features. We use the term conditional buying to characterize 
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circumstances under which a consumer utilizes her past experience with the new service in deciding 
whether to continue buying the service for a second time. Whether conditional buying occurs depends 
upon the price 𝑃!! that the monopolist charges returning customers. For instance, if the monopolist 
lowers 𝑃!! significantly so that 𝑃!! < 𝜃∗, there is no conditional buying by any type of customer because 
irrespective of their past experience all consumers will continue to buy the service again given that their 
expected net payoff (for any 𝜃 > 𝜃∗) is positive for all q realizations. We consider the following two 
cases that can arise at the equilibrium with less than full coverage, contingent upon the value of 𝑃!!:2 
a) 𝜃∗ < 𝑃!! < 𝜃! – Conditional buying by lower tail. Only consumers having very low valuation for 
the existing version condition their continued purchase upon the 𝑞 realization. Consumers having 
high valuation continue to buy irrespective of the realized value of 𝑞. 
b) 𝜃! < 𝑃!! < 𝜃∗ + 𝑞! – Conditional buying by all. All consumers condition their repeat purchase 
decision on 𝑞 irrespective of their valuation for the existing version. 
If the monopolist chooses to attract new customers in the second stage 𝑃!! < 𝜃∗ + !!!  and a new segment 
of consumers defined by the interval 𝜃!, 𝜃∗  purchases the new version in the second stage, where 𝜃! = 𝑃!! − !!! . In the following derivations we investigate which of the above two conditional buying 
regimes can arise when the market is less than fully covered in both stages of the game. 
Assuming conditional buying by every customer type, we can write the payoff function of the 
monopolist in the second stage as follows: 
 𝜋!!" = !!!!!!∗!!!!!!! 𝑑𝜃 +    !!!!!!! 𝑑𝑞𝑑𝜃!!!!!!!!!!∗ .                                                                                      (3) 
 
Note that each experienced customer sometimes buys the service a second time when 𝑞 > 𝑃!! − 𝜃 and 
sometimes does not when 𝑞 < 𝑃!! − 𝜃.  Optimizing the objective (3) with respect to 𝑃!! and 𝑃!! yields 
the second stage equilibrium prices.  For a given 𝜃∗ and conditional buying by each customer type, the 
second period equilibrium prices for the service and the second stage equilibrium profit are given as: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 There are two additional cases that may arise at the equilibrium depending upon the choice of 𝑃!! as follows:   
(i) 𝑃!! < 𝜃∗ – No conditional buying by any type. All returning customers continue to purchase irrespective of the 𝑞 
realization.  
(ii) 𝜃∗ + 𝑞! < 𝑃!! < 𝜃! + 𝑞!  – Conditional buying by upper tail For such a high 𝑃!!, consumers having low 
valuation never purchase the service again and those having high valuation condition their purchase decision on 
the value of 𝑞.  
It can be shown, however, that these two cases are inconsistent with less than full coverage of the market. The proof of this result 
can be provided by the authors upon request.  
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 𝑃!!∗ = !!!!!! + !∗! ,           𝑃!!∗ = !!! + !!!!∗! .                                                                                                   (4) 𝜋!∗!" = !!! (𝑃!!∗ )! + !!!!∗!! 𝑃!!∗ ! .                                                                                                          (5) 
Given the optimal solution derived in the second stage, in the first stage the monopolist chooses 
the price to all customers 𝑃!! to maximize his aggregate profits over the two periods (again, we ignore 
discounting in the aggregation). He knows, in particular, that the choice of price in this period will affect 
the number of consumers who choose to experiment with the new version, i.e., the segment 𝜃! − 𝜃∗. The 
consumer of type 𝜃∗ is indifferent between buying and not buying the new service in period 1, namely 𝐸𝑈 𝜃∗|𝐵𝑢𝑦  𝑖𝑛  𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑  1 = 𝐸𝑈 𝜃∗|𝑁𝑜𝑡  𝑏𝑢𝑦  𝑖𝑛  𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑  1    for this consumer, which from (1) and (2) 
implies that: !!! + 𝜃∗ − 𝑃!! + !!!!!!∗ !!∗ !!!! = !!! + 𝜃∗ −   𝑃!!∗ .                                                                                     (6) 
 
Note that consumers have rational expectations and can anticipate the future prices 𝑃!!∗  and 𝑃!!∗  as 
derived in (4) by solving the optimization problem of the monopolist in the second stage.  The last 
expression on the left hand side of (6) incorporates this information to measure the added expected utility 
of the consumer in the second period as a result of buying the new service in the first period. 
Substituting into (6) the optimal second period prices derived from (4), we can solve for 𝜃∗ in 
terms of 𝑃!!, the first period price charged by the monopolist. The solution for 𝜃∗ in terms of 𝑃!! will 
determine the size of the segment of consumers who choose to experiment with the new version in the 
first period 𝜃! − 𝜃∗ . This solution captures the traditional tradeoff between price and quantity that a 
demand function represents. When the monopolist raises the price 𝑃!! that he charges in the first stage 
fewer consumers purchase the service and experiment with the new features, namely (𝜃! − 𝜃∗) declines. 
The functional relationship that ties 𝜃∗ to 𝑃!!  is obtained from the utility optimization of the consumers. 
The monopolist knows that consumers are sophisticated and can anticipate the expected benefit they will 
derive from buying the service not only in the current period, but in the subsequent period as well. Hence, 
the added benefit obtained by the consumer over both periods as expressed in (6) is used by the 
monopolist in deriving the first period demand for the new version. 
When choosing the first period price the monopolist maximizes his profits over both periods as 
follows: max!!! 𝜋!" = (!!!!∗)!! 𝑃!! + 𝜋!∗!".                                                                                                           (7) 
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where 𝜋!∗!" is given in (5). Optimizing (7) with respect to 𝑃!!, while incorporating the tradeoff between 
price and quantity given in (6), yields the results reported in Proposition 1 for the BI regime. The results 
for the B and I regimes can be similarly obtained. 
 
Proposition 1 
When the market is less than fully covered in both stages of the game: 
(i) There does not exist an equilibrium with conditional buying by all returning consumers under 
the BI and I regimes. 
(ii) Under the B regime such an equilibrium exists when 1.482 < !!!! < 1.603. 
According to part (i) of the proposition, in the BI and I regimes, when the market is less than fully 
covered, the second period price that the monopolist chooses does not support conditional buying by all 
returning customers. Under these two regimes, the monopolist has an incentive to lower prices to new 
customers in the second period in order to expand his market. These lower prices put downward pressure 
on the prices the monopolist can charge returning customers as well. As a result, the price to returning 
customers can never exceed 𝜃! and conditional buying by all cannot arise. In contrast, in the B regime, 
for larger values of the ratio !!!!, there exists an equilibrium that leads to all consumers engaging in 
conditional buying. 
 
2.3.1 “First Best” Outcome 
We now consider an environment where the monopolist does have the power to commit to future prices in 
order to derive a benchmark for the “First Best” pricing of the monopolist. Lack of commitment power 
implies that the monopolist does not have the ability to credibly commit to prices he will charge in the 
future. In particular, he cannot credibly commit to the price returning customers will face in the second 
stage when selling the service to new consumers who are still unfamiliar with the new version. In 
contrast, when the monopolist does have commitment power, he cannot renege on promises regarding 
future prices without incurring significant costs. The costs may be related to loss of reputation or damages 
incurred when breaking a written contract with customers. If such commitment is feasible it leads to the 
highest profits that can be obtained in our environment. We will use this “First Best” outcome as a 
benchmark in evaluating the various price discrimination regimes without commitment. To derive the 
“First Best” we allow the monopolist full flexibility in choosing prices; namely prices can vary by period 
and by the purchase history of the customer. The monopolist chooses these prices in the first period and is 
fully committed to them. Because the monopolist can credibly communicate the future prices 𝑃!! and 
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𝑃!!, consumers no longer have to infer them from the second stage profit maximization of the 
monopolist. Rather, they are guaranteed that the monopolist will not renege on his promised prices. 
Assuming less than full coverage of the market and conditional buying by all returning 
customers, the payoff function for the two periods can be expressed as follows: max!!!,!!!,!!! (!!!!∗)!! 𝑃!! +    !!!!!!∗!!!!!!! 𝑑𝜃 +    !!!!!!! 𝑑𝑞𝑑𝜃!!!!!!!!!!∗ . 
We report the result of the maximization and characterize the “First Best” outcome in Proposition 2. 
Proposition 2 
(i) When the monopolist has full commitment power to set future prices and the market is less than 
fully covered, the equilibrium is characterized by conditional buying by only the lower tail of 
returning customers. The monopolist sets the same price to new customers in both periods, 
implying that no new customers are attracted in the second period. 
(ii) Under the “First Best” the prices set by the monopolist are: 𝑃!! = 𝑃!! = 𝜃∗ + !!! + !!!!∗!!!! !!!! , 𝑃!! = !!!!!∗! , where 𝜃∗ = !!!! !!! ! !!! . 
The expected profits of the monopolist over both periods can be expressed as: 𝐸𝜋∗ = !!!! !!!!! !!!!∗!!!!! + !!!!∗ !!!!!!!!!∗!!∗!!!!!! . 
(iii) The equilibrium with less than full coverage arises when  !!!! < 1.745. 
(iv) 𝑃!! > 𝑃!!. 
When the monopolist can commit to future prices at the beginning of the first period, he never chooses to 
attract new customers in the second stage. As a result, price discrimination is based only upon the past 
behavior of the consumer. The result that the monopolist does not find it optimal to attract new customers 
in the future is similar to that derived in the Durable Good Monopolist literature (Coase (1972), Stokey 
(1979)). In this literature, the profits of the monopolist are highest if he can credibly commit not to lower 
prices to new customers in the future. Hence, regardless of whether the monopolist sells a durable good 
(in the Durable Good Monopolist literature) or an experience based non-durable good (in the current 
setting) such a commitment reduces the incentives of new customers to postpone their purchase. Similar 
to the nonexistence result of conditional buying by all that is reported in part (i) of Proposition 1, here as 
well, when the market is less than fully covered conditional buying by all returning customers cannot 
arise under the “First Best” outcome. Instead, the price set by the monopolist in the second stage is 
sufficiently low so that there is always a segment of returning customers who buy the service a second 
time for all 𝑞 realizations. 
	  
	  
16	  
Part (iii) of the proposition states that the monopolist finds it optimal to abandon part of the 
market only when there is sufficient prior heterogeneity in the consumer valuation of the existing features, 
namely only when the ratio !!!! is sufficiently small. The last part of the Proposition indicates that with 
commitment power the monopolist chooses to reward loyalty by cutting prices to returning customers. 
The cut in price is so significant, in fact, that returning customers of very high valuation for the existing 
version choose to purchase the service again for all values of 𝑞. In contrast, in Section 4 we show that 
when the monopolist cannot commit to future prices and can base pricing on the purchase history of the 
customer (regimes B and BI), he charges returning customers a higher price than new customers. 
 
2.4 PRICE DISCRIMINATION REGIMES WITHOUT COMMITMENT POWER TO 
FUTURE PRICES 
Given that conditional buying by all can never arise under the BI and I regimes when the market is less 
than fully covered in both periods, next we explore the possible existence of the second type of 
conditional buying; specifically, conditional buying by the lower tail of returning customers. We start by 
considering the BI regime that arises when the monopolist has no capacity to commit to ignoring some 
observables when setting prices. Subsequently, we consider the regimes when some partial commitment 
is feasible. Specifically, in the B regime the commitment is that the monopolist will ignore the period of 
purchase when offering a deal to a new customer. Hence, “early adopters” or “late adopters” are treated 
equally. In the I regime the commitment is that the monopolist will not treat returning customers 
differently from new customers. 
 
2.4.1 Behavioral and Intertemporal Price Discrimination (BI Regime): 
Under the BI regime, the monopolist price discriminates based on the customer’s past purchase history 
and time of purchase. Assuming that the market is less than fully covered, the second stage payoff 
function of the monopolist when he uses both behavioral and intertemporal price discrimination can be 
expressed as follows: 𝜋!!" = !!!!!!∗!!!!!!! 𝑑𝜃 +    !!! !!!!! 𝑑𝑞!!!!!!!!!!!∗ 𝑑𝜃 + !!!!! 𝑑𝜃!!!!! . 
 
The revenues of the monopolist in the second stage accrue from three different segments of consumers: a 
segment of new consumers, 𝜃𝜖 𝑃!! − !!!    , 𝜃∗ , a segment of returning consumers whose decision to 
purchase again depends on the q realization, 𝜃𝜖 𝜃∗,𝑃!! , and a segment of returning consumers who 
always buy the service a second time, 𝜃𝜖 𝑃!! , 𝜃! . Optimizing the second stage profit with respect to 𝑃!! 
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and 𝑃!! and substituting the optimal prices back into 𝜋!!", we can express  the second stage profit as a 
function of 𝜃∗ as follows: 𝜋!!"∗ = !!!∗ !!! + !!!∗ ! !!!∗ !!∗!!!!                   
                                                                                                          
Using the relationship between first and second period prices that is implied from the utility equation (6), 
and the optimal second period profit as derived above, the first stage optimization problem of the 
monopolist can be expressed as: max!∗ 𝜋!" = !!!!∗!! 𝑃!!∗ + !!!!!!∗ !!∗ !!!! + 𝜋!!"∗. 
The result of the optimization is summarized in the next proposition. 
 
Proposition 3 
Under behavioral and intertemporal price discrimination (BI) with less than full coverage of the market: 
(i) The prices set by the monopolist can be expressed as: 𝑃!!∗ = !∗! + !!! , 
𝑃!!∗ = !!∗! !∗!!!!! !!!!∗! , 𝑃!!∗ = !∗! + !!! + !!!!∗!!!!∗ !!!!   , where 𝜃∗ solves the equation: !! !!!!∗!! + !!!!!!∗ !!∗ !!!!!!∗ !!∗!! !!!!∗ !!!∗ !!!!∗!! − !!!!!!∗ !!∗ !!!!!!∗ !!∗!  !!!! = 0. 
(ii) The BI equilibrium with less than full coverage exists if:  !!!! < 0.8322. 
(iii) The expected profits of the monopolist over both periods can be expressed as: 𝐸𝜋∗ = !!!∗ !!!!∗!! + !!!∗ !!! + !!!∗ ! !!!∗ !!∗!!!! . 
(iv) 𝑃!!∗ > 𝑃!!∗  and  𝑃!!∗ > 𝑃!!∗ . 
From part (iv) of the proposition, the monopolist lowers his price to new customers in the second period 
in order to expand his market. In comparison to the prices they pay in the first period, experienced 
customers face higher prices in the second period. This implies that the pricing strategy of the monopolist 
does not reward loyalty. Specifically, the monopolist charges a low price to new consumers in the first 
period in order to encourage them to experiment with the new service. Once these consumers choose to 
continue the service a second time, the monopolist charges them a higher price. The monopolist takes 
advantage of the fact that returning customers tend to have higher valuations for the new service as can be 
implied by their decision to buy the service a second time. Because the monopolist does not cover the 
entire market in the first period he also has an incentive to lower prices further to new consumers in the 
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second period in order to encourage consumers with relatively low valuation for the basic features to 
change their minds and experiment with the new version. Note that in the absence of commitment power, 
the monopolist violates two characteristics of the optimal pricing under the “First Best” outcome. First, 
instead of rewarding the loyalty of returning customers the monopolist actually penalizes loyalty. Second, 
instead of keeping prices constant over time to new customers in order to discourage them from 
postponing their purchase, the monopolist cuts prices to new customers in the second stage. 
According to part (ii) of the Proposition, the equilibrium leads to less than full coverage in both 
periods only when the value of  !!!! is sufficiently small (less than 0.8322.) Hence, like in the “First Best” 
case, only if the prior heterogeneity in the consumer valuation of the existing features is sufficiently large 
in comparison to the heterogeneity in their valuation of the new features, the monopolist finds it optimal 
to serve only a portion of the population of consumers.    
 
2.4.2 Behavioral Price Discrimination (B Regime) 
In this section, we derive the equilibrium for behavioral price discrimination where the monopolist price 
discriminates based only on the past purchase behavior of a consumer by charging different prices to new 
and returning customers. We designate these prices by 𝑃! and  𝑃!, for new and repeat customers, 
respectively. Consumers are forward-looking and incorporate the future expected benefit derived in the 
second period in their decision on whether to buy the new version in the first period. The overall expected 
utilities over both periods when buying and not buying the new service, respectively, are as follows: 
 𝐸𝑈 𝜃|𝐵𝑢𝑦  𝑖𝑛  𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑  1 = !!! + 𝜃 − 𝑃! + !!!!!!!!!!!!!! 𝑑𝑞 + !!!!!!!! 𝑑𝑞.                                         (8) 𝐸𝑈 𝜃|𝑁𝑜𝑡  𝑏𝑢𝑦  𝑖𝑛  𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑  1 =   0 +𝑀𝑎𝑥 𝜃 + !!! − 𝑃!  , 0                                                                  (9) 
 
Note that a consumer who did not buy the new version in the first period remains a new consumer in the 
second period as well thus still facing the price 𝑃! if she considers buying in the second period. This 
explains the second term in the expected utility of such a consumer in (9). However, if this consumer 
chooses not to buy the new version in the first period she will continue to do so in the second period as 
well because she faces the same price for the service in either period and has no additional information 
about the upgraded service. As a result, no new customers will be attracted in the second period under this 
regime. 
With conditional buying by only the lower tail of returning customers, the second period expected 
profit of the monopolist can be written as follows: 
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 𝜋!! =    !!! !!!! 𝑑𝑞!!!!!!!!!∗ 𝑑𝜃 + !!!! 𝑑𝜃!!!! .                                                                          (10) 
Optimizing the objective (10) with respect to 𝑃! yields the second stage equilibrium price.  For a given 𝜃∗, the second period equilibrium price for the service and the second stage equilibrium profit are 
summarized as follows: 
𝑃!∗ = !!∗! !∗!!!!! !!!!∗! , 𝜋!∗! = !!∗! !!∗!!∗!!!! . 
 
In the first stage the monopolist chooses 𝑃! to maximize his expected profits over both periods. max!! 𝜋! = (!!!!∗)!! 𝑃! + 𝜋!∗!,                                                                                                              (11) 
 
Substituting into the equation 𝐸𝑈 𝜃|𝐵𝑢𝑦  𝑖𝑛  𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑  1 = 𝐸𝑈 𝜃|𝑁𝑜𝑡  𝑏𝑢𝑦  𝑖𝑛  𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑  1  the expression 
derived for 𝑃!∗ from the second stage equilibrium, we can obtain the relationship between 𝑃! and 𝜃∗, the 
threshold consumer who is indifferent between buying and not buying the new version as follows: 𝑃! = 𝜃∗ + !!! + !!!!∗!!!∗ !!!! .                                                                                                                   (12) 
 
The monopolist incorporates this relationship in maximizing 𝜋!. The result of the maximization is 
reported in Proposition 4. 
 
Proposition 4 
Under behavioral price discrimination (B) with less than full coverage of the market and conditional 
buying by the lower tail: 
(i) The prices set by the monopolist can be expressed as: 
𝑃!∗ = !!∗! !∗!!!!! !!!!∗! , 𝑃!∗ = 𝜃∗ + !!! + !!!!∗!!!∗ !!!! , where 𝜃∗ solves the equation: 𝜃! − 2𝜃∗ − !!! + !!!!!∗!!∗ !!!!!∗!!∗!! !!!∗!!!∗ !!!!∗!! − !!!!!∗!!∗ !!!!!∗!!∗!  !!!! = 0. 
(ii) The equilibrium with less than full coverage and conditional buying by the lower tail exists if: !!!! < 1.47588. 
(iii) The expected profits of the monopolist can be expressed as: 
	  
	  
20	  
𝐸𝜋∗ = !!∗ !!!!∗!! + !!∗! !!∗!!∗!!!! . 
(iv) 𝑃!∗ > 𝑃!∗ . 
As in the bi-dimensional regime BI in the uni-dimensional regime B, as well, the price of the new service 
for returning customers is higher than it is for new customers. As in the earlier regime, the monopolist 
reduces the price to new consumers in order to encourage them to experiment with the new version. Once 
these consumers choose to renew their subscription a second time, the monopolist charges them a higher 
price. The monopolist takes advantage of the fact that returning customers tend to have higher valuations 
for the service, as can be implied by their decision to buy the service a second time. This is in contrast to 
the “First Best” case, where the monopolist charges returning customers a lower price than new 
customers. In essence, under behavioral price discrimination, the monopolist rewards loyalty when he can 
commit to future prices, but punishes loyalty when he does not have such commitment power. 
In contrast to the BI regime, however, the monopolist does not attract any new customers in the 
second stage because he does not lower the price to new customers in this stage, given that only past 
behavior and not time is utilized as a price discrimination device. Note that according to Proposition 1, 
when 1.6 > !!!! > 1.48, there is conditional buying by all returning customers under the B regime, an 
outcome that can never arise under the BI regime when the market is less than fully covered. 
2.4.3 Intertemporal Price Discrimination (I Regime) 
Under intertemporal price discrimination, the monopolist price discriminates based on time only by 
charging different prices in the first and second periods. He does not discriminate in his pricing, however, 
between new and returning customers in spite of the fact that he has access to the subscription histories of 
different consumers. Let 𝑃! represent the price of the new version in the first period and 𝑃! its price in the 
second period. Similar to the analysis in the previous cases, we have to derive the added expected utility 
from buying the new version in the first period in order to determine the segment of consumers who buy 
in the first period. 
 𝐸𝑈 𝜃|𝐵𝑢𝑦  𝑖𝑛  𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑  1 =      !!! + 𝜃 − 𝑃! + !!!!!!!!!!!!!! 𝑑𝑞 + !!!!!!!! 𝑑𝑞.                                       (13) 𝐸𝑈 𝜃|𝑁𝑜𝑡  𝑏𝑢𝑦  𝑖𝑛  𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑  1 =   0 +𝑀𝑎𝑥 𝜃 + !!! − 𝑃!  , 0                                                                (14) 
 
Unlike in the B regime but similar to the BI regime, with intertemporal price discrimination a consumer 
who did not buy the new version in the first period may face a new price 𝑃! in the second period. As a 
result, consumers may choose to buy the new version in the second period even though they did not do so 
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in the first. However, only if 𝑃! < 𝑃! there might be some consumers who choose to postpone their 
purchase to the second period. From (13) and (14) if   𝑃! ≥ 𝑃!, 𝐸𝑈 𝜃|𝐵𝑢𝑦  𝑖𝑛  𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑  1 > 𝐸𝑈 𝜃|𝑁𝑜𝑡  𝑏𝑢𝑦  𝑖𝑛  𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑  1  for all 𝜃 values, implying that all the consumers 
who choose to buy the new version, do it in the first period. If the monopolist chooses to attract new 
customers in the second stage 𝑃! < 𝜃∗ + !!!  and a new segment of consumers defined by the interval 𝜃!, 𝜃∗  purchases the new version in the second stage, where 𝜃! = 𝑃! − !!! . 
With conditional buying by only the lower tail of returning customers, we can express the second 
period expected profit of the monopolist as follows: 
 𝜋!! = !!!! 𝑑𝜃 +!∗!!!!!!!!!       !!! !!!! 𝑑𝑞!!!!!!!!!∗ 𝑑𝜃 + !!!! 𝑑𝜃!!!! .                                                                 (15) 
The monopolist chooses 𝑃! to maximize (15). Differentiating 𝜋!!  with respect to 𝑃! and solving the first 
order condition for 𝑃!, yields the second period equilibrium price and profits as a function of 𝜃∗   as 
summarized below: 
𝑃!∗   = ! !∗!!! ! !∗!!!!∗!!!!!!!!!!!!!! , 𝜋!∗! = !!∗  ! !!!!!∗  !!∗!!!! . 
 
The expansion of the market will occur at the equilibrium only if the solution for 𝑃!∗ satisfies the 
inequality 𝑃!∗ < 𝜃∗ + !!! , which holds for all values of  !!!! that support this equilibrium. 
In the first stage the monopolist chooses 𝑃! to maximize his profits over both periods. Assuming 
that an expansion of the market occurs implies the following optimization: max!! 𝜋! = (!!!!∗)!! 𝑃! + 𝜋!∗!,                                                                                                                  (16) 
 
The value of 𝜃∗ can be expressed in terms of the price 𝑃!  by solving the equation 𝐸𝑈 𝜃|𝐵𝑢𝑦  𝑖𝑛  𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑  1 = 𝐸𝑈 𝜃|𝑁𝑜𝑡  𝑏𝑢𝑦  𝑖𝑛  𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑  1  (from (13) and (14)) after substituting 𝑃!∗ from 
the second stage equilibrium. Proposition 5 is implied by this maximization: 
 
Proposition 5 
Under intertemporal price discrimination (I) with less than full coverage of the market: 
(i) The prices set by the monopolist can be expressed as: 
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𝑃!∗ = ! !∗!!! ! !∗!!!!∗!!!!!!!!!!!!!! , 𝑃!∗ = 𝑃!∗ + !!!!∗!!!∗ !!!! , where 𝜃∗ solves the equation: !!!!!∗!!!∗!!!∗!!!! !!!!∗!! + !!!!!∗!!∗ !!!!!∗!!∗!! !!!∗!!!∗!!!! !!!!∗!! − !!!!!∗!!∗ !!!!!∗!!∗!  !!!! = 0. 
(ii) The equilibrium with less than full coverage exists if:    !!!! < 1.28367. 
(iii) The expected profits of the monopolist can be expressed as: 𝐸𝜋∗ = !!∗ !!!!∗!! + !!∗! !!!!!∗!!∗!!!! . 
(iv) 𝑃!∗ > 𝑃!∗. 
Similar to the BI regime, with intertemporal discrimination as well, the monopolist finds it optimal to 
lower the price to new customers in the second stage in order to expand his market coverage. Because low 
valuation consumers choose not to purchase the service in the first period the monopolist is tempted to 
lower the price further in the second period in order to encourage some of these low valuation consumers 
to join the market. However, in contrast to the BI regime the monopolist does not discriminate based upon 
past behavior of the consumers, and as a result, both  new and returning customers benefit from the same 
lower price charged in the second stage. The pattern of prices to returning customers is similar, therefore, 
to that derived under the “First Best” outcome, where the monopolist rewards returning customers by 
offering them a lower price in the second period. However, under intertemporal price discrimination the 
same lower price is offered also to new customers, thus leading to some customers postponing their 
purchase to the second period.  
2.4.4 Comparison of the Three Price Discrimination Regimes 
In Proposition 6 we compare the three price discrimination regimes in terms of profitability and market 
coverage. 
Proposition 6 
(i) 𝜋! > 𝜋! > 𝜋!". 
(ii) 𝜃! − 𝜃∗ ! > 𝜃! − 𝜃∗ ! > 𝜃! − 𝜃∗ !"   . 
According to Proposition 6 when the monopolist cannot commit to future prices his profits are highest if 
he bases discrimination only on time, and lowest under the two dimensional price discrimination regime 
that incorporates both behavior and time in pricing. Behavioral price discrimination that bases 
discrimination only on the past subscription history of the consumer is ranked as intermediate between the 
other two regimes. Intertemporal price discrimination duplicates the pattern of prices in the “First Best” 
outcome by rewarding returning customers with a lower price in the second period. However, in contrast 
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to the “First Best”, the same lower price is offered also to new customers in the second period. This 
introduces two counteracting effects on the incentives of consumers to purchase the new service early. On 
the one hand, low valuation consumers for the basic version can anticipate that the monopolist will lower 
prices in the future in order to expand his market coverage, thus providing them an incentive to postpone 
their purchase in order to benefit from the lower prices. On the other hand, however, high valuation 
consumers for the basic service do not have to worry about being held hostage by the monopolist when 
they choose to renew their subscription. They have a stronger incentive, therefore, to experiment with the 
service in the first period, thus providing them with the opportunity to assess their valuation of the new 
features early and allowing them also to benefit from an extra period of consumption. According to part 
(i) of the Proposition, the latter favorable effect is so significant that the regime of intertemporal price 
discrimination yields the highest profits to the monopolist. According to part (ii) of the Proposition, it is 
regime B, however, that encourages the biggest number of customers to buy early as there is no incentive 
for a new customer to postpone purchase to the second period. The BI regime yields the smallest number 
of customers buying the service early because of the combined effect of encouraging low valuation 
consumers (for the basic version) to postpone the purchase in order to benefit from lower prices to new 
customers in the future and high valuation consumers (for the basic version) to be less inclined to 
purchase early because of their concern of facing higher prices as returning customers in the future. 
From the results reported in Proposition 6 it follows that the monopolist benefits most from the 
regime where only time is incorporated in pricing. Recall, however, that this regime may not be easy to 
implement. The monopolist has to find a credible way of convincing consumers that he will never use 
their purchase history to charge higher prices to experienced customers. Using anonymizing technologies 
that make it hard to identify repeat customers may offer the monopolist a vehicle to implement this 
regime. Alternatively, contemporaneous Most Favored Customer clauses that offer to reimburse 
customers if any other customer is charged a lower price in a given period can also facilitate 
implementing this regime. In the absence of such commitment devices, the most likely regime to arise is 
regime BI, where both behavioral and intertemporal price discrimination arises. Because the monopolist 
sells subscription services he can observe customers’ past history and distinguish between new and 
returning customers. In addition, because he has limited ability to commit to future prices, he will have an 
incentive to vary the price to new consumers over time in order to expand his market and attract 
additional relatively low valuation consumers. Hence, the bi-dimensional price discrimination regime 
(regime BI) is the most sensible outcome that is likely to arise in this case. 
	  
	  
24	  
2.4.5 No Price Discrimination 
In the addition to the B and I regimes where the monopolist possesses a mechanism to partially commit to 
different segments of the consumers, we now consider another possible regime where the monopolist can 
commit never to utilize price discrimination; either based on time or on purchase history. Specifically, he 
can commit to selling the service for the same price in both periods and credibly communicate to 
consumers that the price he sets for the product early on will remain the same in the future irrespective of 
whether they are new or returning customers.  Note that this type of commitment is actually stronger than 
the one utilized under the B or I regimes, given that the same price has to be credibly promised to two 
different types of consumers. However, it falls short of the full commitment case assumed under the 
“First Best” outcome, in which case the monopolist has full flexibility to vary prices across groups and 
credibly communicate to each group future prices early in the first period. We characterize in Proposition 
7 the equilibrium that arises when a policy of no price discrimination is feasible. 
 
Proposition 7 
When a commitment to practice a policy of no price discrimination is feasible, the monopolist sets the 
same price for both periods and no new customers are attracted in the second period. When the market is 
less than fully covered in both periods, there is conditional buying by the lower tail only. The price set by 
the monopolist and his expected profits are given as: 𝑃! = 𝑃! = !!! + !!! , 𝐸𝜋∗ = !!! 1 + !!!!! !. 
The equilibrium with less than full coverage exists when  !!!! < 1.488. 
In Table 1 we conduct numerical calculations to illustrate the characterization of the three price 
discrimination regimes as well as the no price discrimination regime. Note that in order to obtain prices, 
the entries in the Table should be multiplied by 𝜃!. To obtain profits, the profit columns should be 
multiplied by 𝜃!!. 
	  
Table	  1:	  Comparison	  of	  Price	  Discrimination	  Regimes	  	  
According to the numerical results reported in Table 1, a commitment to “no price 
discrimination” policy yields higher profits to the monopolist than either one of the three regimes of price 
P2N P2R P1N Profit PR PN profit P2 P1 profit P2=P1 Profit PR PN Profit
0.100 0.578 0.314 0.640 0.321 0.492 0.457 0.549 0.508 0.550 0.492 0.501 0.542 0.550 0.466 0.300 0.551 0.471 0.510 0.540 0.551
0.200 0.556 0.328 0.676 0.343 0.536 0.422 0.593 0.524 0.602 0.472 0.506 0.574 0.603 0.433 0.350 0.605 0.443 0.519 0.581 0.605
0.300 0.534 0.342 0.709 0.368 0.583 0.390 0.633 0.546 0.657 0.446 0.513 0.603 0.657 0.399 0.400 0.661 0.414 0.529 0.621 0.662
0.400 0.512 0.356 0.740 0.393 0.631 0.359 0.670 0.569 0.713 0.417 0.523 0.631 0.715 0.366 0.450 0.720 0.385 0.538 0.662 0.722
0.500 0.490 0.370 0.770 0.418 0.683 0.330 0.705 0.595 0.772 0.386 0.535 0.658 0.775 0.332 0.500 0.781 0.357 0.548 0.702 0.784
0.600 0.468 0.384 0.799 0.444 0.736 0.300 0.739 0.622 0.834 0.355 0.547 0.686 0.837 0.299 0.550 0.845 0.328 0.557 0.743 0.849
0.700 0.446 0.398 0.827 0.470 0.792 0.271 0.771 0.650 0.898 0.323 0.560 0.713 0.903 0.265 0.600 0.911 0.299 0.567 0.783 0.917
0.800 0.423 0.412 0.854 0.497 0.849 0.242 0.802 0.678 0.965 0.290 0.573 0.740 0.971 0.231 0.650 0.980 0.271 0.576 0.824 0.987
BI	  Regime With	  Commitment	  No	  Price	  DiscriminationI	  RegimeB	  Regime
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discrimination we have considered. In particular, “no price discrimination” dominates the most profitable 
intertemporal price discrimination regime I. The main reason being, that a constant price over both 
periods eliminates the incentive of consumers to postpone their purchase. Note, however, that profits with 
a constant price are still lower than profits that accrue under the “First Best” outcome, when the 
monopolist has full commitment power and chooses to reward the loyalty of returning customers by 
charging them a lower price. 
It is noteworthy that the ranking of the different pricing regimes in terms of their profitability 
would likely remain the same if we considered a model with more than two periods of consumption, as 
long as the market remained less than fully covered in each of the periods. With less than full market 
coverage, the monopolist would still have incentives to cut prices to new customers in later periods in 
order to expand his market coverage. However, with multiple periods this incentive would likely weaken 
over time as a bigger portion of consumers had already joined the market. In addition, in the absence of 
commitment power, the monopolist would still have incentive to hike the price to returning customers 
even in a multi-period model. This incentive would likely weaken, once again, over time as the expanded 
market coverage implies that a bigger number of consumers with relatively low valuations of the basic 
service become part of the group of returning customers.          
2.5 PRICING WITH FULL MARKET COVERAGE 
So far, we focused attention on analyzing the different pricing regimes when there is less than full 
coverage of the market in both periods. Less than full coverage implies that in each period there are some 
consumers who have not tried the new service as of yet. Hence, our focus has been on relatively new and 
growing markets that are far from reaching their saturation stage. In the present section we investigate 
how the different pricing regimes compare when the market is fully covered, namely when the market has 
reached a more mature stage where all consumers have tried the new service. Using the notation we use in 
the paper, when 𝜃∗ = 0. It is noteworthy that with full coverage of the market, the monopolist no longer 
has incentives to lower his price to new consumers in the second period (under the BI and I regimes) in 
order to attract consumers with relatively low valuation for the basic service who choose to refrain from 
consumption in the first period. In the absence of such incentives on the part of the monopolist, 
consumers no longer have any reason to postpone their purchase to the second stage in anticipation of 
lower prices in the future.  As well, full coverage of the market implies also that our environment 
becomes very similar to the environment modeled in Jing (2011). Specifically, Jing assumes that there is 
uni-dimensional heterogeneity in the consumer population in terms of their valuations, and that apriori, all 
consumers are identical. The consumers’ uncertainty is fully resolved after experimenting with the 
product for one period. The monopolist designs his pricing to induce all consumers to engage in 
experimentation. In our model the heterogeneity of consumers is bi-dimensional, and even before 
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consumers experiment with the new service, their valuation of the basic service is different. The pricing 
of the monopolist determines which segment of consumers chooses to experiment early. However, when 
the market is fully covered, the latter strategic choice of the monopolist disappears, and like in Jing, the 
monopolist designs his pricing to induce all the consumers to experiment with the product early. 
When there is full market coverage in the first period, the market is no longer segmented into 
those who buy and do not buy in the first period, and the monopolist faces only returning customers in the 
second period. The pricing problem of the monopolist reduces to finding a price to inexperienced 
customers in the first period and a price to experienced customers in the second period.  The BI regime is 
equivalent, therefore, to the B regime, as there are no new customers in the second period. Moreover, 
because there are no incentives to cut the price to new consumers in the second period, the I regime is 
also equivalent to the other two price discrimination regimes. 
A consumer of type 𝜃∗ = 0, evaluates her expected surplus as the sum of her expected utility in 
the first period and her expected utility of possibly buying the service again in the second period, 
contingent on her experience with the new features in the first period.  The monopolist chooses the first 
period price to extract the entire expected surplus of a consumer of type 𝜃∗ = 0.  Specifically, !!! + 𝜃∗ − 𝑃! + !!!∗!!!!!!!!!!!∗ 𝑑𝑞 + !!!!!!!∗! 𝑑𝑞 = 0.                                                                         (17) 
 
Following a similar approach to that used in deriving the equilibrium with less than full coverage, the 
two-stage optimization yields the equilibrium characterized in Proposition 8. 
 
Proposition 8 
When  !!!! > 1.47588, 𝜃∗ = 0 and the market is fully covered under all pricing regimes. In this case, all 
three regimes yield identical prices and profits. Specifically, 
(i) When 1.47588 < !!!! < 1.5 there is conditional buying by only the lower tail of returning 
customers, and: 
𝑃! = 𝑃! = !!! + !!! !!!!!! !!!! , 𝑃! = 𝑃! = !! 𝑞!𝜃!, 𝐸𝜋∗ = 𝑞! + !!! − !! !! 𝑞!𝜃!, 𝑃! > 𝑃!. 
(ii) When 1.5 < !!!!, there is conditional buying by all returning customers, and: 
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𝑃! = 𝑃! = !"!!!!!!!!!!!!!!"!! , 𝑃! = 𝑃! = !!! + !!! , 𝐸𝜋∗ = !"!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!"!! , 𝑃! > 𝑃! if  !!!! < 2.9. 
(iii) When the market is fully covered and the monopolist has full commitment power to set future 
prices, the “First Best” is characterized by conditional buying by only the lower tail of returning 
customers, and: 𝑃! = !"!!!!!"!!!!!!!!!!"!! , 𝑃! = !! 𝜃!, 𝑃! > 𝑃!. 
According to Proposition 8 when the extent of prior heterogeneity in the consumer valuation is relatively 
small (i.e., !!!! > 1.47588) the monopolist finds it optimal to serve the entire market right away. In this 
case the equivalence result we report in the Proposition is similar to that derived in Jing when the price to 
returning customers (referred to as “full information price” in Jing) exceeds the consumer’s average 
valuation of the product. In this case, Jing finds that behavioral and intertemporal price discrimination 
schemes lead to identical pricing and profits. Even though in his comparison, Jing identifies two distinct 
cases contingent upon whether the price to returning customers is higher or lower than the average 
valuation, for the uniform distribution we consider, the former is always the case, and the two pricing 
mechanisms are equivalent in Jing as well. Note that Jing makes a different assumption concerning 
consumer expectations than we make in our model. In our model, with behavioral price discrimination, 
consumers expect the monopolist to offer a different price to new consumers only when there are some 
unserved customers still to attract (i.e., 𝜃∗>0). However, when the market is fully covered 𝜃∗=0, the 
consumer does not expect any reduction in prices to new customers in the future (Stokey (1979) makes a 
similar assumption in her model.) As a result, the equivalence between the B and I regimes would 
continue to hold in our model even if the distribution functions of the valuations were not uniform. With 
behavioral price discrimination in Jing, however, even if at the equilibrium no consumer postpones her 
purchase to the second stage, a consumer still expects that the monopolist has a special price for a 
deviating consumer who decides to postpone her purchasing of the product to the second stage. Hence, it 
is this type of “out of equilibrium” pricing that introduces a difference between the B and I regimes for 
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some distribution functions. At any rate, for the uniform distribution, the different assumptions 
concerning consumer expectations lead to the same equivalence result reported in Proposition 8.      
When the market is fully covered the average valuation of a consumer of type 𝜃∗=0 is 0 + !!! . 
It is easy to show from the expressions derived for 𝑃! in parts (i) and (ii) of the Proposition that 𝑃! > !!! , 
and the price to returning customers exceeds, indeed, the average valuation of the threshold consumer. 
Note that like in the case with less than full market coverage, the “First Best” outcome with full coverage 
is still characterized by rewarding the loyalty of consumers (in part (iii) of the Proposition 𝑃! > 𝑃!.) In 
contrast, in the absence of commitment power, the pattern of prices reported in parts (i) and (ii) of the 
Proposition is opposite to that derived under the “First Best”, and returning customers face a higher price 
than new customers. 
2.6 EFFECT OF CORRELATION BETWEEN THE VALUATIONS OF THE BASIC AND 
NEW FEATURES 
In the analysis so far, we assumed that there is no correlation between the consumer’s valuations of the 
new and existing features. In the absence of any correlation, the only way the consumer can learn about 
her valuation of the new features is by experimenting with the new service. The consumer’s familiarity 
with her preference for the basic features does not provide her with any valuable information regarding 
her valuation of the new features. However, if 𝜃 and 𝑞 are not independently distributed, the value of 𝜃 
does provide valuable information about the value of q, and the importance of learning via 
experimentation declines. In the extreme case of perfect correlation between 𝜃 and 𝑞, the consumer can 
predict her valuation of the new features before even using the new service, and there is no additional 
learning derived by the consumer when using the new service. In order to assess the effect of such 
absence of learning, we now consider this extreme case of perfect correlation by assuming that the 
marginal distributions of 𝜃 and 𝑞 are as we assumed so far (i.e., uniform over 0, 𝜃!  and 0, 𝑞! , 
respectively.) However, a given value of 𝜃 uniquely determines the value of q according to the equation 𝑞 = 𝜃 !!!!.  Hence, the value of q is set at the same decile as that of 𝜃 and Pr 𝜃 ≤ 𝜃! = Pr 𝑞 ≤   𝜃! !!!! =!!!! .  In Proposition 9, we characterize the equilibrium with perfect correlation. 
 
Proposition 9 
When there is perfect correlation between the consumer’s valuations of the basic and new features and the 
market is less than fully covered, all three pricing regimes are equivalent and identical to the optimal 
pricing under the “First Best” outcome. Specifically, 𝑃!! = 𝑃!! = 𝑃!! = !!!!!! . 
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𝐸𝜋∗ = !!!!!! . 
When there is perfect correlation between 𝜃 and 𝑞, the monopolist charges the same price to new and 
returning customers and does not vary prices over time. This pricing is also optimal under the “First Best” 
outcome, when the monopolist has full commitment power. Hence, in the absence of any learning on the 
part of consumers, it is completely inconsequential whether the monopolist has the capacity to commit to 
future prices. The “First Best” outcome can be achieved even without any such capacity. This result is 
reminiscent of a similar result derived in the Durable Good Monopoly literature. In this literature it has 
been established that by reverting to leasing instead of outright selling of the durable good the monopolist 
can restore the “First Best” outcome, even in the absence of commitment power to setting future prices. 
The subscription environment we consider in the present model is similar to the leasing proposed in this 
previous literature. However, in the durable good monopolist literature it is assumed that the consumer 
faces no uncertainty and is fully familiar with her valuation of the product. The existence of full 
correlation in our setting eliminates the uncertainty facing the consumer because she can fully infer the 
value of q from the observation of 𝜃. It is not surprising, therefore, that like the leasing result obtained in 
the Durable Good Monopolist literature, in our setting of subscription with perfect correlation, as well, 
the “First Best” outcome can be achieved even without commitment power.  This result indicates that the 
uncertainty facing the consumer regarding her valuation of the new features and the process of learning 
via experimentation is the driving force behind the divergence of the results under the various pricing 
regimes we consider.  
Having considered the extreme cases of independence and perfect correlation between the 
valuations, we now develop a modelling approach that allows us to consider an intermediate case of 
partial correlation between the valuations. This will allow us to assess the effect of increased correlation 
on the different pricing regimes we consider. 
To consider intermediate values of correlation between 𝜃 and 𝑞, we introduce a parameter ℎ that 
measures the probability that 𝜃 and 𝑞 are independently distributed. The complementary probability of 1 − ℎ  measures the probability that there is perfect correlation between 𝜃 and 𝑞, as specified in 
Proposition 9. Both the monopolist and the consumer are aware of these probabilities and incorporate 
them in their evaluations. For example, a consumer of type 𝜃 expects the value of new service to be !!!  
with probability h and 𝜃 !!!! with probability   1 − ℎ . Therefore, in the case of the BI regime, the expected 
utility that a consumer of type 𝜃 receives from buying and not buying the upgraded service in period 1 
can be expressed as follows: 
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𝐸𝑈 𝜃|𝐵𝑢𝑦  𝑖𝑛  𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑  1 = ℎ 𝜃 + !!! − 𝑃!! + !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! + 1 − ℎ 𝑀𝑎𝑥 𝜃 1 + !!!! −𝑃!! , 2𝜃 1 + !!!! − 𝑃!! − 𝑃!! . 𝐸𝑈 𝜃|𝑁𝑜𝑡  𝐵𝑢𝑦  𝑖𝑛  𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑  1 = 𝑚𝑎𝑥 0, ℎ 𝜃 + !!! + 1 − ℎ 𝜃 1 + !!!! − 𝑃!! . 
 
Note that in case of perfect correlation (with probability 1 − ℎ), a consumer who bought the new service 
in the first period may or may not buy it again. A consumer of type 𝜃 whose valuation of q is equal 𝜃 !!!!  
will not buy the new service a second time for the price 𝑃!! if 𝜃 1 + !!!! < 𝑃!! and will buy it a second 
time in the opposite case. 
Assuming less than full market coverage in both periods, the equilibrium with no correlation 
leads to learning by only the lower tail of returning customers. Assuming that this remains true with 
partial correlation as well, the second stage payoff function of the monopolist in the BI regime can be 
expressed as follows: 
𝜋!!" = !!!!!!∗! 𝑑𝜃 + ℎ !!! !!!!! 𝑑𝑞!!!!!!! 𝑑𝜃 + !!!!! 𝑑𝜃!!!!!!!!!∗ + 1 − ℎ !!!!! 𝑑𝜃  when  𝑃!! > 𝜃∗ 1 + !!!!   !!!!"#$%&!!!!!!∗! 𝑑𝜃 + ℎ !!! !!!!! 𝑑𝑞!!!!!!! 𝑑𝜃 + !!!!! 𝑑𝜃!!!!!!!!!∗ + 1 − ℎ !!!!∗!!                             when  𝑃!! < 𝜃∗ 1 + !!!!    (18)  
 
The first part of the payoff function represents the profit from new customers in the second 
period. The cutoff value 𝜃 represents the threshold customer in the second stage who is indifferent 
between buying and not buying in the second period. The utility of the threshold consumer can be written 
as ℎ 𝜃 + !!! + 1 − ℎ 𝜃 1 + !!!! − 𝑃!! = 0, the solution to which yields the threshold 𝜃.  The second 
integral represents the profit from returning customers if 𝜃 and 𝑞 are independent. The third integral 
represents the profit from returning customers when there is perfect correlation between 𝜃 and 𝑞.  The 
expression for this integral depends on the comparison between the values of 𝑃!!   and  𝜃∗ 1 + !!!! . If  𝑃!! > 𝜃∗ 1 + !!!!   , a consumer of type 𝜃∗ will not buy the service a second time if  𝑞 = 𝜃∗ !!!!.  
Moreover, only when 𝜃 > !!!!!!!!! ≡ 𝜃!"#$%& an experienced consumer will buy the service a second time, 
where 𝜃!"#$%& > 𝜃∗. If 𝑃!! < 𝜃∗ 1 + !!!!   , all the consumers in the region 𝜃∗, 𝜃!  will buy the service a 
second time in case of perfect correlation. The equation that characterized the indifferent consumer 𝜃∗ can 
be written as: 
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ℎ 𝜃∗ + !!! − 𝑃!! + !∗!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!∗ + 1 − ℎ 𝑀𝑎𝑥 𝜃∗ 1 + !!!! − 𝑃!! , 2𝜃∗ 1 + !!!! − 𝑃!! − 𝑃!! = ℎ 𝜃∗ +
!!! + 1 − ℎ 𝜃∗ 1 + !!!! − 𝑃!!  .                                      (19) 
 
Optimizing the second stage profit (18) with respect to 𝑃!! and 𝑃!! and utilizing (19) to express the first 
period price as a function of 𝜃∗ leads to an optimization problem in the decision variable 𝜃∗. Using the 
same approach, we derive the equilibrium for the B and I regimes. The analytical approach to solving for 𝜃∗ is cumbersome. Therefore, we perform a numerical analysis to compare the three regimes for varying 
levels of the parameter h that measures the degree of independence between the distributions of 𝜃 and q. 
The results of the numerical analysis are summarized in Table 2. 
	  
Table	  2:	  Comparison	  of	  Price	  Discrimination	  Regimes	  in	  the	  Presence	  of	  Correlation.	  
In the Table we consider only values of the ratio !!!!  that support the existence of the equilibrium with less 
than full market coverage under all regimes when h=1, the case we considered so far (according to 
Propositions 3-5 !!!! <     0.8322). For this range of values, it can be verified that under the BI regime for 
small values of h the monopolist sets the price to returning customers equal to 𝜃∗ 1 + !!!! , so that with 
h P2R Profit PR Profit P2 Profit PS Profit
0.2 0 0.5000 0.6000 0.6000 0.6000 0.5000 0.6000 0.6000 0.6000 0.5000 0.6000 0.6000 0.6000 0.5000 0.6000 0.6000 0.6000
0.2 0.2 0.5856 0.7027 0.7027 0.5381 0.4835 0.5801 0.6122 0.5994 0.4961 0.5954 0.5658 0.5995 0.4867 0.5841 0.5893 0.5998
0.2 0.4 0.5713 0.6855 0.6855 0.5370 0.4668 0.5602 0.6129 0.5992 0.4921 0.5905 0.5457 0.5994 0.4732 0.5679 0.5789 0.6002
0.2 0.5 0.5641 0.6770 0.6770 0.5368 0.4589 0.5507 0.6110 0.5993 0.4895 0.5874 0.5377 0.5996 0.4665 0.5598 0.5738 0.6007
0.2 0.6 0.5570 0.6684 0.6684 0.5367 0.4512 0.5415 0.6083 0.5996 0.4865 0.5838 0.5306 0.6000 0.4597 0.5516 0.5689 0.6013
0.2 0.7 0.5499 0.6599 0.6599 0.5369 0.4438 0.5325 0.6050 0.6001 0.4832 0.5799 0.5239 0.6004 0.4530 0.5435 0.5640 0.6020
0.2 0.8 0.5428 0.6514 0.6514 0.5373 0.4365 0.5238 0.6012 0.6007 0.4796 0.5755 0.5176 0.6010 0.4462 0.5355 0.5592 0.6029
0.2 0.9 0.5357 0.6428 0.6428 0.5379 0.4293 0.5151 0.5970 0.6015 0.4757 0.5708 0.5115 0.6018 0.4395 0.5274 0.5546 0.6039
0.2 1 0.5285 0.6342 0.6342 0.5360 0.4221 0.5065 0.5926 0.6024 0.4715 0.5658 0.5055 0.6026 0.4328 0.5194 0.5500 0.6050
0.4 0 0.5000 0.7000 0.7000 0.7000 0.5000 0.7000 0.7000 0.7000 0.5000 0.7000 0.7000 0.7000 0.5000 0.7000 0.7000 0.7000
0.4 0.2 0.5731 0.8024 0.8024 0.6253 0.4739 0.6635 0.7077 0.6985 0.4895 0.6852 0.6434 0.6988 0.4755 0.6657 0.6774 0.6992
0.4 0.4 0.5469 0.7656 0.7656 0.6237 0.4466 0.6252 0.7057 0.6987 0.4768 0.6675 0.6062 0.6994 0.4494 0.6292 0.6560 0.7008
0.4 0.5 0.5339 0.7474 0.7474 0.6241 0.4326 0.6056 0.7022 0.6996 0.4693 0.6570 0.5973 0.7001 0.4359 0.6103 0.6457 0.7025
0.4 0.6 0.5209 0.7292 0.7292 0.6254 0.4185 0.5858 0.6975 0.7011 0.4610 0.6454 0.5764 0.7022 0.4222 0.5911 0.6358 0.7049
0.4 0.7 0.5079 0.7111 0.7111 0.6275 0.4041 0.5658 0.6918 0.7032 0.4517 0.6324 0.5627 0.7043 0.4083 0.5717 0.6263 0.7078
0.4 0.8 0.4949 0.6929 0.6929 0.6305 0.3895 0.5453 0.6852 0.7058 0.4413 0.6179 0.5495 0.7071 0.3943 0.5520 0.6172 0.7113
0.4 0.9 0.5325 0.7455 0.7476 0.6294 0.3747 0.5245 0.6779 0.7092 0.4298 0.6017 0.5364 0.7105 0.3801 0.5321 0.6084 0.7153
0.4 1 0.4685 0.6559 0.6559 0.6392 0.3595 0.5033 0.6700 0.7132 0.4168 0.5835 0.5233 0.7147 0.3657 0.5120 0.6000 0.7200
0.6 0 0.5000 0.8000 0.8000 0.8000 0.5000 0.8000 0.8000 0.8000 0.5000 0.8000 0.8000 0.8000 0.5000 0.8000 0.8000 0.8000
0.6 0.2 0.5621 0.8993 0.8993 0.7115 0.4659 0.7454 0.7994 0.7972 0.4846 0.7753 0.7210 0.7976 0.4657 0.7452 0.7644 0.7981
0.6 0.4 0.5257 0.8412 0.8412 0.7100 0.4291 0.6866 0.7914 0.7985 0.4646 0.7433 0.6687 0.7996 0.4280 0.6848 0.7314 0.8015
0.6 0.5 0.5079 0.8126 0.8126 0.7120 0.4098 0.6556 0.7852 0.8009 0.4524 0.7238 0.6575 0.8005 0.4080 0.6529 0.7160 0.8053
0.6 0.6 0.4901 0.7841 0.7841 0.7157 0.3897 0.6235 0.7779 0.8046 0.4384 0.7015 0.6262 0.8061 0.3874 0.6198 0.7013 0.8104
0.6 0.7 0.4722 0.7556 0.7556 0.7214 0.3688 0.5901 0.7695 0.8096 0.4224 0.6758 0.6065 0.8113 0.3661 0.5858 0.6874 0.8169
0.6 0.8 0.4542 0.7267 0.7267 0.7291 0.3471 0.5553 0.7601 0.8161 0.4037 0.6459 0.5871 0.8181 0.3443 0.5508 0.6742 0.8249
0.6 0.9 0.4956 0.7929 0.8085 0.7286 0.3242 0.5188 0.7498 0.8241 0.3816 0.6106 0.5674 0.8266 0.3217 0.5148 0.6617 0.8342
0.6 1 0.4172 0.6675 0.6675 0.7511 0.3002 0.4804 0.7386 0.8338 0.3547 0.5675 0.5470 0.8374 0.2985 0.4776 0.6500 0.8450
0.8 0 0.5000 0.9000 0.9000 0.9000 0.5000 0.9000 0.9000 0.9000 0.5000 0.9000 0.9000 0.9000 0.5000 0.9000 0.9000 0.9000
0.8 0.2 0.5521 0.9937 0.9937 0.7968 0.4591 0.8263 0.8885 0.8954 0.4807 0.8653 0.7978 0.8961 0.4571 0.8228 0.8504 0.8964
0.8 0.4 0.5072 0.9129 0.9129 0.7959 0.4138 0.7449 0.8726 0.8983 0.4546 0.8183 0.7311 0.8996 0.4087 0.7357 0.8055 0.9021
0.8 0.5 0.4853 0.8735 0.8735 0.8002 0.3894 0.7010 0.8632 0.9029 0.4382 0.7888 0.7172 0.9008 0.3825 0.6885 0.7849 0.9086
0.8 0.6 0.4635 0.8342 0.8342 0.8076 0.3637 0.6546 0.8529 0.9098 0.4191 0.7543 0.6771 0.9113 0.3550 0.6391 0.7655 0.9176
0.8 0.7 0.4415 0.7948 0.7948 0.8184 0.3364 0.6055 0.8417 0.9192 0.3964 0.7134 0.6519 0.9207 0.3263 0.5873 0.7474 0.9291
0.8 0.8 0.4193 0.7547 0.7547 0.8328 0.3073 0.5531 0.8296 0.9313 0.3689 0.6641 0.6269 0.9332 0.2962 0.5332 0.7305 0.9433
0.8 0.9 0.4579 0.8242 0.8662 0.8338 0.2760 0.4968 0.8165 0.9463 0.3348 0.6026 0.6012 0.9495 0.2646 0.4763 0.7147 0.9602
0.8 1 0.3726 0.6707 0.6707 0.8739 0.2421 0.4358 0.8023 0.9646 0.2900 0.5221 0.5734 0.9707 0.2314 0.4165 0.7000 0.9800
BI	  Regime B	  Regime I	  Regime No	  Price	  DiscriminationParameters
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full correlation each returning customer ends up purchasing the new service a second time. For bigger 
degrees of independence, when h is close to 1, the price to returning customers is strictly higher than 𝜃∗ 1 + !!!! , implying that in the case of full correlation only a subset of returning customers with 
relatively high valuations for the basic service buy the new service a second time. We also find that in the 
B regime the price to returning customers is set strictly above 𝜃∗ 1 + !!!!  and in the I regime, it is set 
strictly below 𝜃∗ 1 + !!!! , implying that with full correlation and the B regime only a subset of returning 
customers and in the I regime all returning customers buy the service a second time.  
In addition to the three price discrimination regimes we also include in the Table the regime of 
“no price discrimination” that we discussed in Section 4.5.  From the Table we can observe that the 
ranking of the regimes remains the same as established for the case that h=1, even in the presence of 
correlation between 𝜃 and 𝑞. We can observe that perfect correlation (i.e., h=0) leads to equivalence 
among the four pricing regimes, consistent with the result reported in Proposition 9. As the extent of 
correlation decreases (h increases) the difference in profits among the regimes increases. This indicates 
that as the extent of correlation decreases, the importance of learning through experience is more 
significant, thus leading to greater divergence in profitability among the regimes. 
2.7 CONCLUSION 
Coase (1972) suggested that a monopolist selling a durable good can overcome time inconsistency issues 
related to lack of commitment power by leasing the durable good. Although the current trend of selling 
software subscriptions corresponds to such a leasing strategy, we demonstrate in this paper that it does not 
necessarily resolve the time inconsistency problem when there is uncertainty regarding the value of the 
new technology. This uncertainty creates intertemporal incentives for the consumers and the monopolist 
that are absent in the earlier literature. We investigate the effect of such uncertainty on price 
discrimination strategies when selling a new technology in a subscription environment. When the 
monopolist lacks the ability to commit to future prices, we find that the choice of optimal pricing strategy 
depends on whether or not the entire population of consumers chooses to adopt the new technology early. 
If there is a segment of the population who postpone the purchase of the technology, we find that the best 
price discrimination strategy is intertemporal price discrimination, where only time, and not past behavior 
of the customer, serves as a basis for discrimination. Moreover, if the monopolist can credibly commit 
never to adopt any form of price discrimination, his profits are even higher. Even though it may be 
difficult to enforce commitment devices that promise not to differentiate between new and returning 
customers or not to vary prices in the future, especially in the B2C markets, firms can establish a 
reputation for following such policies by not offering introductory discounts that tend to favor new over 
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returning customers and by not varying prices over time. When the entire population of consumers 
chooses to adopt the technology early, we find that intertemporal and behavioral price discrimination 
strategies yield identical profits. Regardless of whether or not all consumers are “early adopters” though, 
the monopolist cannot achieve the “First Best” outcome that requires full commitment power to credibly 
communicate future prices. However, when the consumer’s familiarity with the existing features of the 
technology provides her with a perfect signal of her valuation of the new features of the technology 
(because there is possibly perfect correlation between the valuations) the consumer no longer faces any 
uncertainly and Coase’s prediction is restored, namely the “First Best” outcome is attainable even without 
any commitment device.  
We make several simplifying assumptions to illustrate the effect of learning on the pricing 
strategies. Relaxing some of these assumptions is unlikely to change our qualitative results. For instance, 
the assumption that valuations are uniformly distributed in the population keeps the model analytically 
tractable, while allowing us to measure the extent of heterogeneity in the consumer population in terms of 
a single parameter; namely the spread of the distribution. Relaxing this assumption by considering a 
general distribution is unlikely to change our qualitative results. For simplification, we also consider a 
two period model to illustrate the comparison among the pricing regimes. Extending the model to 
multiple periods is unlikely to provide any additional insights, as we illustrate our results in both growing 
and saturated markets.  In addition, we do not allow the monopolist to alleviate some of the uncertainty 
facing the consumer regarding the value of the new technology. In practice, most service providers offer 
free trials for a limited time to encourage consumers to experiment in a risk free environment. However, 
the trials, being limited in nature, are unlikely to resolve completely the uncertainty facing the consumer.  
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3 ESSAY 2: VERSIONING AND EX-POST BUNDLING OF NEW 
SERVICES IN SUBSCRIPTION MARKETS 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
Driven by cost effectiveness and ease of implementation, cloud computing is driving the consumerization 
of Information technology. Companies offering software as a service (SaaS) such as Salesforce, Jive, 
Workday, and Intacct offer cloud based services, ranging from CRM and marketing to accounting and HR 
solutions. There is large variability in the pricing schemes utilized by these firms, and innovation in 
pricing may be the driver of growth and profitability in the highly competitive market. Most of the cloud 
based software services are offered on a subscription basis, ranging from monthly to annual contracts. 
Versioning is a very popular strategy in this space, with services providers offering several editions of 
their flagship services, to address the distinct requirements of businesses of different sizes. For example, 
Salesforce offers 5 versions of its flagship CRM software called Sales Cloud. Following the success of 
their flagship services, companies invest in new services and enhanced features that help to deepen their 
existing customer relationships. For example, Salesforce extended its CRM software to include software 
that supports customer service and marketing functions. When introducing new services, the important 
decision facing a multi-product or multi-service firm is to choose the right selling strategy. The service 
provider can either sell the new service on its own, or offer the new service as a part of the existing 
offerings.  
The new service may be offered along with the primary service in different ways. It may be 
included with all versions of the primary service, or selectively, with only the higher versions of the 
primary service.  A common practice among firms offering cloud-based services is to offer the new 
service at no additional cost with higher versions of the primary service and to sell the new service 
separately for customers subscribing to lower-end versions. For example, Salesforce offers new services, 
such as Salesforce Identity and Private App Exchange, at no additional cost to customers subscribing to 
the premium versions of Sales Cloud. The premium version of the primary service can therefore be 
considered as a bundle comprised of the primary service at a higher quality level and future service 
enhancements in the form of new services. This can be treated as a special case of the traditional mixed 
bundling strategy. In the traditional mixed bundling strategy, the service provider offers for sale both a 
bundle and individual products, so that consumers who are interested in both products may buy the 
bundle, and consumers who are interested in one product but not in the other may buy that product 
separately. However, in the context of the examples cited above where the primary service is offered in 
multiple versions, bundling may be more complicated. While the new service is offered separately in 
addition to being offered as a part of the bundle, the primary service is not offered separately at the same 
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quality level as the one included in the bundle. We can apply insights from traditional bundling literature 
to analyze the pricing of new service introductions. However, the pricing problem differs from the 
existing bundling literature in the following way: new services are introduced at a later point in time after 
the quality levels and the prices for the various versions of the primary service are announced. The service 
provider lacks the flexibility to vary the price of primary service when new services are introduced in a 
later period due to the presence of price agreements that restrict price changes over time. The service 
provider should therefore, account for future service enhancements when choosing the price schedule for 
the primary service.   
In this paper, our goal is to investigate the pricing strategies of a service provider offering 
vertically differentiated variants of a service and introducing new services that either enhance or extend 
the existing service offerings. We analyze two strategies that are commonly practiced by firms selling 
information goods and software services: Discriminative Bundling (DB) and Independent Pricing (IP).  
Using the discriminative bundling strategy (DB), a service provider, offering multiple versions of the 
primary service, offers new services at no additional cost to customers buying premium versions of the 
primary service, and sells the new service separately to remaining customers. Using the independent 
pricing strategy (IP), the service provider offers the new service separately to all consumers, including 
those buying lower and higher end versions. There may be other variations of such bundling strategies in 
practice, depending on the number of versions of the primary service, and the compatibility of the new 
service with the primary service. For example, one less common form of bundling is bundling the new 
service with all versions of the primary service, in addition to selling new service separately for non-
subscribers. We focus our attention on the most general cases of discriminative bundling and independent 
pricing, as the insights from comparing the two extreme cases can be applied to other less common cases 
as well.  The price of the premium version reflects future enhancements.  
We analyze the pricing strategies in a two-period monopoly setting. We assume that a service 
provider offers only two versions of the primary service: a basic version and a premium version. In the 
first period, the service provider announces the quality levels of the basic and of the premium versions, 
and the corresponding schedule of prices. We assume that the quality levels of the two versions are 
exogenously determined, and that the monopolist chooses the optimal price for the basic and the premium 
versions based on the quality levels. The monopolist introduces a new service in the second period, and 
has a choice between selling the new service independently to all customers and offering the new service 
at no additional cost to customers subscribing to the premium version. A consumer can derive a positive 
value from using the new service either on its own or in combination with the primary service. At the 
beginning of the second period, the monopolist announces the pricing strategy and the corresponding 
standalone price for the new service when sold separately. Consumers make their purchase decisions 
	  
	  
36	  
based on the price schedule for the primary service, and the standalone price for the new service.  We 
assume that the price of the basic and the premium versions in the second period remain the same as in 
the first period to reflect the commitment issues in practice. Firms have very little flexibility to change the 
subscription prices of the primary services from one period to another due to the complexity inherent in 
subscription contracts and the potential negative impact of strategic consumer behavior on profits (Coase 
(1972)).  It is not uncommon to see firms maintaining the same subscription prices for more than five 
years. The monopolist can anticipate future service enhancements and account for them in choosing the 
current period prices. Therefore, the monopolist chooses the optimal price schedule for the primary 
service by taking into account the future enhancements and the pricing strategy for the new service. In the 
second period, when introducing the new service, the monopolist only chooses the optimal standalone 
price for the new service, based on the first period prices of the primary service.  
As shown in the existing literature (Bhargava and Choudhary (2001)), versioning of the primary 
service is optimal only when consumer valuations for the service are non-linear in nature. Non-linear 
valuations can explain two important features of information goods and services: (1) higher consumer 
types gain a greater increase in utility than do lower types for the same increase in the quality of service, 
and (2) consumers do not necessarily gain greater value from increasing the quality of service, due to the 
disutility from including too many features (Thompson et.al. (2005)). Therefore, consumer valuations for 
the primary service may be described by a non-linear function. The primary service can be versioned 
based on the number of features included in each version, or by the amount of usage allowed in each 
version. For example, Sales Cloud is versioned based on the type and number of features offered in each 
version, while Force.com is versioned based on the number of custom objects that are included in each 
version3. While the primary service is suitable for versioning, the new service may not be suitable for 
versioning. For example, a new service, such as the Private App exchange is not suitable for versioning as 
it represents a unique functionality that can aid a consumer in achieving a clearly defined goal. In 
addition, depending on the nature of new service, consumers’valuations for the primary and the new 
service may be correlated and the degree of correlation may depend on the nature of the new service. For 
new services that represent a direct extension to the primary service, valuations may be positively 
correlated and the degree of correlation may be relatively high.  On the other hand, for new services that 
represent a radically new functionality not directly related to the primary service, the degree of correlation 
may be relatively low and may even be negative.  We, therefore, model consumer valuations for the new 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  The	  website	  provides	  details	  of	  various	  products	  of	  Salesforce	  and	  the	  available	  versions.	  	  
http://www.salesforce.com/crm/editions-­‐pricing.jsp.	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service using a linear function, and analyze the effect of the nature of the relationship between the new 
and primary service on the optimality of pricing policies.   
We contribute to the literature on bundling and versioning by combining the unique aspects of 
each pricing strategy. We compare the discriminative bundling (DB) and the independent pricing (IP) 
strategies in terms of their profitability for two types of valuation function for the new service. We first 
analyze the pricing strategies, assuming that the new service is a direct extension to the primary service 
and consumer valuations for the new service are perfectly correlated with their preference for the primary 
service. All consumers agree on the quality level of the new service, and the heterogeneity arises only due 
to the heterogeneity in consumer’s preference for the primary service. In such a setting, we find that 
discriminative bundling unambiguously leads to lower profits when compared to the independent pricing 
strategy. Mixed bundling allows a monopolist offering two services to more efficiently extract the surplus 
from fringe customers who have very high valuation for one service and not the other. However, when 
consumer valuations for the two services are positively correlated, this cannot be realized as consumers 
with very high valuation for one service also have a high valuation for the other service. When the 
monopolist has the flexibility to price the bundle so as to maximize the second period profit, there is no 
difference in profits that can be achieved from the DB and IP strategies. This result is similar to the 
findings in the existing literature. However, when the monopolist does not have the flexibility to vary the 
price of the premium version over time, he charges a lower price for the bundle when compared to the no 
commitment price to balance the loss in revenue from selling the premium version to fewer consumers in 
the first period. Due to the presence of perfect correlation between consumer valuations for the new and 
the primary service, the standalone price for the new service directly depends on the price of the bundle 
and it is also lower when compared to the no commitment case. The decrease in the price of the new 
service, combined with a less than proportionate increase in the price of the premium version, lead to 
lower profits in the DB strategy.  
We next analyze the case where the new service is a radically new functionality not directly 
related to the primary service. Although, we ideally want to study the case where the valuation for the 
new service is completely independent of the primary service, it is too complex to solve analytically and 
does not lead to closed form solutions. We therefore, assume that the preference for the new service 
within a segment of consumers is independent of their preference for the primary service but introduce an 
idiosyncratic component in the valuation for the new service that depends on whether the new service is 
used separately, or along with the premium version. When the value that can be obtained from the new 
service by using it along with the premium version is higher (lower) than the value that be obtained by 
using it without the premium version, it represents complementarity (substitutability) between the new 
and primary services. This approach allows us to understand how the nature of the relationship between 
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the new and primary services influences the pricing strategies. In this setting, we find that the comparison 
of profits in the DB and IP strategies is not unambiguous as it was in the previous case. Specifically, the 
DB strategy may lead to higher profits than the IP strategy when the heterogeneity among consumer 
preferences for the primary service is sufficiently large, and when there is sufficiently large difference in 
the value that can be obtained from the new service when consumed as a part of the bundle and when 
consumed on its own. Even in this case, commitment to the price of the primary service restricts the 
monopolist from charging the optimal bundle price and leads to a lower price for the premium version in 
both periods. However, when valuation for the new service is not directly related to the valuation for the 
primary service, the monopolist can at least, extract the complete surplus from consumers buying the new 
service separately.  
3.2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
Versioning and bundling have been studied extensively in the context of information goods and services. 
Versioning is the practice of offering vertically differentiated variants of a product at different prices. 
Earlier studies on vertical differentiation (see Bhargava and Choudhary (2001) for a review) show that it 
is an optimal strategy, in the presence of non-zero marginal costs that increase either proportionally, or 
more rapidly, as quality increases.  In the context of information goods, where marginal costs are 
negligible, earlier studies show that versioning is not optimal when consumer valuations are linear 
(Bhargava and Choudhary (2001), Varian (1997)). Subsequent studies analyzed the effect of non-linear 
consumer valuations (Bhargava and Choudhary (2004)), positive network effects (Bhargava and 
Choudhary (2004) and Jing (2007)), competition (Jones and Mendelson (2011) and X. Wei and Nault 
(2006)) and antipiracy goals  (Chellappa and Shivendu (2005)), and show that versioning of information 
goods is optimal under certain conditions.  In a recent paper (X. D. Wei & Nault (2014)) study the 
optimality of versioning when consumers with horizontal taste preferences are linked by vertical group 
tastes.  
Bundling, as a price discrimination strategy, has received tremendous interest from researchers 
and practitioners alike (see Venkatesh and Mahajan (2009) for a detailed review of the literature in 
bundling). In the context of information goods, where marginal costs are negligible, Bakos and 
Brynjolfsson (1999) show that bundling a large number of unrelated information goods is optimal. On the 
other hand, Geng, Stinchcombe, and Whinston (2005) show that pure bundling is sub-optimal when 
consumer valuations decrease with an increase in the number of products in the bundle. Wu, Hitt, Chen, 
and Anandalingam (2008) develop a non-linear mixed integer programming approach to price a 
customized bundle of information goods.  However, none of the above studies consider the combination 
of bundling and versioning that is quite popular in cloud based software services. We bridge the gap in 
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the literature by developing a two-period model, with price commitment, that reflects the decision process 
of service providers in practice. Similar to the existing literature, we find that bundling is less profitable 
than independent pricing when consumer valuations for the new and the primary service are positively 
correlated. Since the monopolist starts charging the bundle price from the first period even before the 
introduction of new service, a higher bundle price will lead to a lower number of consumers buying the 
premium version in the first period. Therefore, the monopolist chooses an optimal price for the bundle 
that maximizes overall profits in contrast to a bundle price that maximizes only the current period profits. 
However, when the value derived from the new service is different when consumed as a part of the 
bundle and on its own, bundling can lead to higher profits when compared to independent pricing when 
there is sufficiently large heterogeneity in consumer preferences for the primary service and in the 
presence of strong complementarity or substitutability between the new and the primary service. This is in 
contrast to findings in existing literature (Venkatesh and Kamakura (2003)), where mixed bundling leads 
to lower profits when compared to pure components when the bundled products are strong substitutes. 
When products are strong substitutes, the bundle is less valuable and consumers buy their preferred 
product separately. The divergence in the results is due to the fact that the type of mixed bundling we 
consider varies from the traditional definition of mixed bundling. Unlike previous studies, in our setting a 
consumer who has a high preference for the premium version does not have the option of buying the 
premium version outside the bundle.  Therefore, even in the presence of strong substitutability, bundling 
the new service with the premium version does not discourage consumers from buying the bundle. .  
3.3 MODEL SETUP 
A monopolist offers a primary service at more than one quality level. The quality level may represent the 
number of features or the amount of good that can be used by the customer. Without loss of generality, 
we assume that the monopolist offers two versions of the service: a basic version (L) of lower quality 𝑣! > 0 and a premium version (H) of higher quality 𝑣! (𝑣! > 𝑣!). All consumers agree that the quality 
of the premium version is higher than the quality of the basic version. However, consumers are 
heterogeneous in their preferences for the services of the firm. We denote the heterogeneity by a 
parameter 𝜃 that is distributed uniformly over the interval 0, 𝜃! .  Let 𝑃! denote the price of the basic 
version (L) and 𝑃! the price of the premium version (H). We assume that the utility that a consumer of 
type 𝜃 derives from using the service of quality 𝑣 can be represented by the following function:   
𝑈 𝜃, 𝑣 = 𝜃𝑣 − !!!   .  
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Higher customer types or customers with a high preference for the services of the firm get greater utility 
from using the same quality as 𝑈! 𝜃, 𝑣 > 0  𝑓𝑜𝑟  𝑎𝑙𝑙  𝑣 > 0. In addition it satisfies the Spence-Mirrlees 
single-crossing property. A consumer of type 𝜃 derives a utility of 𝑈 𝜃, 𝑣  in each period of consuming 
the service. In contrast to the utility form described in Sundararajan (2005) and Hui et.al. (2007), we 
assume that the marginal utility of a consumer decreases after attaining a maximum. Each customer of 
type 𝜃 has a unique quality level 𝑣∗ that maximizes her utility. This indicates that a customer does not 
necessarily gain higher utility from an increase in the quality level of the service, and may even suffer a 
decrease in utility from consuming a product with 𝑣 > 𝑣∗. The literature on information services pricing 
indicates that consumer utility from information goods and software services is best described by a non-
linear utility function. The assumption of a non-linear utility function helps describe the important feature 
of the service that high type consumers derive a larger increase in value than do lower types from the 
same increase in the quality of the service. In addition, it is not optimal for a monopolist to offer more 
than one version or quality level of a service unless the marginal utility of a customer is non-constant 
(Bhargava and Choudhary (2004)).  
The monopolist announces the quality levels and price schedule for the various versions of the 
primary service at the beginning of the first period. Based on the quality levels and prices, consumers 
choose the version that maximizes their surplus. This segments the consumer population into three 
groups: those who do not subscribe to any version, those who subscribe to the basic version, and those 
who subscribe to the premium version.   
3.3.1 Market Segmentation with Pure Versioning 
Given the two versions L and H with quality levels 𝑣! and 𝑣!, and their corresponding prices 𝑃! and 𝑃!, 
the surplus derived by a consumer of type 𝜃 is given by 𝑈 𝜃, 𝑣 − 𝑃. The segmentation of the market is 
as shown in Fig 1. There are two cutoff points that divide the population of consumer into three segments. 
Let 𝜃! denote the type of threshold customer who is indifferent between not subscribing to either version 
and subscribing to the lower quality version L. Let  𝜃! represent the type of threshold customer who is 
indifferent between buying the basic (L) and the premium version (H).  
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Figure 1: Segmentation of consumers under pure versioning. 
	  
We can derive the threshold customer type 𝜃! and 𝜃!, who is indifferent between buying the basic version 
and not buying at all and who is indifferent between buying the basic version and the premium version 
respectively, by solving the following equations:  
𝑈 𝜃!, 𝑣! − 𝑃! = 0,                                                                                                                                   (1) 
𝑈 𝜃!, 𝑣! − 𝑃! = 𝑈 𝜃!, 𝑣! − 𝑃! .                                                                                                           (2) 
Equations (1) and (2) also ensure that the incentive compatibility constraint and individual rationality 
conditions are automatically satisfied.  
Determination of the cutoff points yields the size of the customer segments for the basic version 
and for the premium version. We can derive the payoff function of the monopolist by establishing the 
profit that can be gained from each of these segments as follows: max!!,!! 𝜋! = !!! 𝑃!   𝑑𝜃!!!! + !!! 𝑃!   𝑑𝜃!!!!                                                                                             (3) 
The result of the maximization is summarized in Proposition 1.  
Proposition 1 
A monopolist offering a service at two qualities levels 𝑣! and 𝑣! can maximize his profits by charging 
the following prices at the equilibrium: 
𝑃! = !! 𝑣! 2𝜃! − 𝑣! . 
𝑃! = !! 𝑣! 2𝜃! − 𝑣! . 
The equilibrium exists only when 𝜃! > !!!!!! .  
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Pure versioning is optimal only when the heterogeneity among consumers measured by the parameter 𝜃!, 
is greater than the average quality of the primary service. In the absence of sufficient level of 
heterogeneity among consumers, it is not profitable for the monopolist to offer a lower quality version. 
Pure versioning does not take into account any future product or service enhancements. However, in 
practice, firms continuously invest in developing new services and features that can either complement 
the existing service or expand the services of the firm.  In the next section, we model the decision 
problem of a monopolist offering a new service in the second period, and analyze the pricing strategies.  
3.4 PRICING NEW SERVICE INTRODUCTIONS 
The monopolist introduces a new service (N) in the second period. The new service can be used on its 
own, or it can be used in conjunction with the primary service.  The new service may represent a limited 
functionality that is not suitable for versioning and can be offered only at a single quality level. Let 𝑞 
denote the quality level of the new service.   The utility that a consumer derives from using the new 
service is linear in nature, so that all consumers, irrespective of whether they are low or high types, derive 
the same increase in utility from a marginal increase in the quality of the service. We, therefore, assume 
that the consumer utility from using the new service is of the form 𝑈 𝜃, 𝑞 = 𝜃𝑞. For example, Salesforce 
introduced new features, such as Salesforce Identity and Private App Exchange, which represent a 
functionality that is independent of the primary service. Those features are offered at a single quality 
level, and both non-subscribers and subscribers of the primary service can derive a positive value from 
using the services.  
The monopolist may sell the new service in different ways. He may sell the new service on its 
own independent of the primary service or bundle the new feature with the primary service for no 
additional price. Depending on the approach, bundling the new service with the primary service leads to 
an increase in surplus achieved by the consumer in the second period. Although consumer valuation for 
the primary service does not vary from one period to another, the additional value from the new service 
can shift the segmentation of consumers inherited from the first period. For example, bundling the new 
service with all versions of the primary service may encourage some non-subscribers with sufficiently 
high preferences to begin subscribing to the basic version in the second period. Similarly bundling the 
new service with only the premium version may encourage subscribers of the basic version to upgrade to 
the premium version in the second period.  We describe each of these strategies in detail, in the next 
section, and derive the equilibrium for each case.  
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3.4.1 Independent Pricing Equilibrium 
In independent pricing, the monopolist sells the new service separately to all consumers. The pricing of 
the new service is completely independent of the price schedule for the primary service. Both subscribers 
and non-subscribers of the primary service buy the new service separately if their valuation for the service 
is sufficiently high. If we let  𝑃! denote the price of the new feature offered as a standalone service, a 
consumer of type 𝜃 will buy the new service if  𝜃𝑞 > 𝑃!.  
The monopolist can choose the price for new service by solving the following maximization problem: 
  max!! 𝜋! = !!!!!!!!! 𝑑𝜃 + 𝜋!.                                                                                                                  (4) 
Solving the optimization problem in one variable yields the optimal price for the new service 𝑃! = !!!! .  The profit from the new service is  !!!! .  
The second period payoff to the monopolist is the sum of the profits from the primary service and 
from the new service. As consumer valuations for the primary service do not change from one period to 
another, the payoff from the primary service remains the same as in the case of pure versioning. The 
monopolist continues to charge the same optimal prices for the basic and the premium versions as 
described in Proposition 1. The new service leads to an expansion in the segment of consumers who buy 
the services offered by the monopolist, as  !!! < 𝜃!.  
3.4.2 Discriminative Bundling Equilibrium 
Using discriminative bundling, which is a form of mixed bundling, a firm offers both a bundle and pure 
components for sale to a heterogeneous group of consumers. However, using discriminative bundling, the 
monopolist offers the bundle to a select group of customers, and sells the services separately to the 
remaining customers. In the context of versioning, the firm may offer the bundle only to subscribers of 
premium versions, while selling the component services separately to remaining customers. For example, 
Salesforce bundles new features such as Salesforce Identity and Private App Exchange, with premium 
versions of Sales Cloud. Subscribers to the lower end versions are required to pay for the new features 
separately.  
While the existing literature provides extensive analyses of versioning and bundling, considering 
the two strategies separately, our work extends the literature by analyzing pricing strategies that combine 
the two popular price discrimination mechanisms. Although versioning can be considered as the offering 
bundles of various sizes depending on the number of features included in each, the separation in time 
between announcing the price schedule for the primary service and introducing the new service lead to 
interesting dynamics behavior of the firm and the consumers. As the new service is introduced after the 
quality levels and the price schedule are announced, the monopolist can observe the segmentation of 
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customers in the first period based on the announced prices, and use this information in making the 
second period decisions. We consider a two-period model, in which the monopolist can account for future 
expected service enhancements, and choose the price schedule for the primary service that optimizes 
current and future profits. By observing the segmentation of customers based on the prices announced in 
the first period, the monopolist can choose the optimal price for the new service in the second period. This 
modelling approach allows us to take into account the commitment issues that firms face with respect to 
the pricing of subscription services.  
We begin with the second period, and derive the optimal price for the new service as a function of 
the optimal first period prices for the basic and premium versions. The monopolist inherits the 
segmentation of consumers from the first period based on the prices for the basic and premium versions, 
and uses that information to define the segment of consumers who buy the new service. Using the 
discriminative bundling strategy, the monopolist bundles the new service with the premium version of the 
primary service.  Let 𝑃! be the standalone price of the new service for subscribers of the basic version 
and non-subscribers to the existing service. Non-subscribers and subscribers to the basic version will buy 
the new feature if 𝜃𝑞 > 𝑃!. Because the price schedule for the primary service remains unchanged in the 
second period, some consumers who are currently subscribing to the basic version may upgrade to the 
premium version if the increase in utility from using the new service is greater than the difference in 
surplus from consuming the basic and premium versions. However, the relative prices of the premium 
version, the basic version, and the new service determine whether any existing consumers buy the new 
service separately. When the price of the premium version is greater than the sum of the basic version and 
the new service, there will be a segment of existing customers who buy the new service separately. On the 
other hand, if the price of the premium version is less than the sum of the prices for the basic version and 
the new service, none of the existing customers of the basic version will buy the new service separately. 
Depending on the relative prices for the primary service and for the new service, three different cases 
might arise at the equilibrium, as follows: 
i) 𝑃! > 𝑃! + 𝑃!.  
ii) 𝑃! ≤ 𝑃! + 𝑃! and !!! < 𝜃!. 
iii) 𝑃! ≤ 𝑃! + 𝑃! and !!! > 𝜃!. 
We analyze each of these cases in detail, and derive conditions on the parameter values that give rise to 
each type of equilibrium.   
Case (i): 𝑃! > 𝑃! + 𝑃!. 
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When the premium version is more expensive than buying the basic version and the new service 
separately, some basic version subscribers continue with the same version in the second period also and 
buy the new service separately. Basic version subscribers with sufficiently high 𝜃 will upgrade to the 
premium version, as the additional utility from the new service 𝜃𝑞 makes the premium version more 
attractive. Depending on the prices for the new and primary service, there may be five different segments 
of consumers in the second period as shown in Fig 2.  
Figure 2: Segmentation of consumers in the second period when 𝑷𝑯 > 𝑷𝑳 + 𝑷𝑵. 
 
Segment A is the segment of consumers who do not buy any service. Segment B is the segment of 
consumers who buy only the new service. Segment B is non-empty only if the price for the new service is 
sufficiently low, specifically !!! < 𝜃!. Segment C is the segment of consumers who continue to buy the 
basic version; they buy the new service separately if 𝑃! < 𝜃𝑞. Segment D is the segment of consumers 
who upgrade to the premium version in the second period. Segment E is the segment of consumers who 
continue to buy the premium version, as they now get a better service at the same price. Based on these 
segments, we can derive the payoff function of the monopolist. The second stage optimization problem of 
the monopolist may be expressed as follows:  
max!! 𝜋! = !!!!!!!!! 𝑑𝜃 + !!!!!!!! 𝑑𝜃 + !!!! 𝑑𝜃!!!! + !!!! 𝑑𝜃!!!! .                                                                 (5) 
The thresholds 𝜃! and 𝜃! in the second period payoff function are inherited from the first stage, and solve 
the utility equations in (1) and (2). The 𝜃! in the payoff function represents the preference of the threshold 
customer who is indifferent between shifting to the premium version and continuing with the basic 
version in the second period and buying the new separately. The threshold 𝜃! can be derived by solving 
the following utility equation: 
𝑈 𝜃!, 𝑣! − 𝑃! + 𝜃!𝑞 − 𝑃! = 𝑈 𝜃!, 𝑣! + 𝜃!𝑞 − 𝑃!.                                                                            (6) 
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The solution of the equation yields the expression for 𝜃! as a function of the first period prices and the 
quality of the new service as follows: 
𝜃 = (!!!!!!!)!(!!!!!!!) + (!!!!!)(!!!!!!!).                                                                                                                      (7) 
The first integral in the payoff function given in (5) represents the revenue from selling the new service 
separately at price 𝑃! to non-subscribers and basic version subscribers of the primary service.  The 
second integral represents the payoff from subscribers of the basic version. The third integral represents 
the additional payoff from subscribers who shift from the basic version to the premium version after the 
introduction of the new service. The last integral represents the revenue from customers who continue to 
subscribe to the premium version.   
Solving the second stage maximization problem yields the equilibrium standalone price of the 
new service as a function of the first period price for the basic and premium versions 𝑃! and 𝑃! as 
follows: 𝑃! = ! ! !!!!! !!!!!!!!! !!!!!!! .                                                                                                                        (8) 
Note that the standalone price for the new service depends on the difference in the price of the premium 
and the basic versions. The firm can charge a higher price for the new service when the difference is 
large.  The standalone price for the new service is also an increasing function of the ratio of the quality 
level of the new service and the difference in the quality levels of the basic and premium versions. As the 
quality level of the new service increases, the monopolist can charge a higher standalone price for the new 
service.  Substituting the optimal standalone price 𝑃! in the second period payoff function (5) yields the 
optimal second stage profit as a function of the first period prices for the basic and the premium versions.  
Lemma 1 
The equilibrium with 𝑃! > 𝑃! + 𝑃! exists when the values of 𝜃! and !!!!!! fall into one of the regions 
described below:  
a) !!!!!! < 𝜃! < !!!!!!!   and 0 < !!!!!! < 4 !!!!!!! − !!  or 
b) 𝜃! > !!!!!!!  and 0 < !!!!!! < !!!!!!!!!. 
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For 𝑃! > 𝑃! + 𝑃! to arise at the equilibrium, the heterogeneity among consumers needs to be higher than 
the average quality of the primary service, the same condition that supports simple versioning.  In 
addition, it requires that the quality level of the new service is sufficiently low. Whereas greater 
heterogeneity supports finer segmentation in the second period, low quality of the new service allows the 
monopolist to charge a higher price for the premium version, when compared to the price for the new 
service and for the basic version. Substituting the optimal standalone price 𝑃! from (8) in the second 
period payoff function (5) yields the optimal second stage profit.  
Case (ii): 𝑃! ≤ 𝑃! + 𝑃! and !!! < 𝜃!.  
When 𝑃! ≤ 𝑃! + 𝑃!, buying the premium version is less expensive than buying the basic version and the 
new service separately. Therefore, consumers with sufficiently high valuations for both the primary 
service and the new service will upgrade to the premium version in the second period. When the price of 
the new service is sufficiently low, specifically, !!! < 𝜃!, all the basic version subscribers derive a 
positive surplus from buying the new service, and, therefore, find it optimal to upgrade to the premium 
version at a lower price. Therefore, there are no buyers for the basic version in the second period, leading 
to only three segments of consumers in the second period, as shown in Fig 3.  
Figure 3: Segmentation of consumers in the second period when 𝑷𝑯 ≤ 𝑷𝑳 + 𝑷𝑵 and 𝑷𝑵𝒒 < 𝜽𝟏. 
 
Segment A is the segment of consumers who do not buy any service. Segment B is the segment of 
consumers who buy only the new service. D is the segment of consumers who buy the premium version 
in the second period, and segment E is the segment of consumers who continue to buy the premium 
service. Therefore, consumers have a choice between buying only the new service or buying the premium 
version. Based on these segments, the second stage optimization problem of the monopolist can be 
expressed as follows: 
max!! 𝜋! = !!!!!!!!! 𝑑𝜃 + !!!! 𝑑𝜃!!!! .                                                                                                       (9) 
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The limit 𝜃! represents the type of the threshold customer who is indifferent between buying only the new 
service and upgrading to the premium version. The threshold customer type can be derived by solving the 
following utility equation that compares the utility gained from buying the new service and from 
upgrading to the premium version: 
𝜃!𝑞 − 𝑃! = 𝑈 𝜃!, 𝑣! + 𝜃!𝑞 − 𝑃!.                                                                                                      (10) 
The solution to equation (10) yields an expression for 𝜃! as a function of the first period price for the 
premium version, the price for the new service, and the quality level of premium version as follows: 
𝜃! = !!!!!!! + !!! .                                                                                                                                    (11) 
Solving the maximization problem in (9) yields the equilibrium standalone price of the new service as a 
function of the first period price for the premium versions 𝑃! as follows: 
𝑃! = !(!!!!!!!)!(!!!!) .                                                                                                                                    (12) 
Equation (12) shows that the optimal price for the new service depends only on the price for the premium 
version and the quality levels of the new service and the premium version. As the quality level of the new 
service increases in comparison to the quality level of the premium version, the monopolist can charge a 
higher price for the new service. This encourages more consumers to upgrade to the premium version. 
Substituting the optimal price for new service from (12) in the payoff function in (9) yields the optimal 
second stage profit as a function of the first period prices.  
Lemma 2 
The equilibrium with 𝑃! ≤ 𝑃! + 𝑃! and !!! < 𝜃! exists when the values of 𝜃! and !!!!!! fall into one of 
the regions described below:  
a) !!! < 𝜃! ≤ !!!  and 𝑞 > !!! !!!!!!!!!!!!  
b) !!! < 𝜃! ≤ !!!!!!  and 𝑞 > 0.  
c) 𝜃! > !!!!!!  and !!!!!! > !!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!.  
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Unlike the previous case, the equilibrium with 𝑃! ≤ 𝑃! + 𝑃! and !!! < 𝜃! exists even when the 
heterogeneity among consumers is smaller than the average quality of the primary services 𝜃! < !!!!!! , 
thereby expanding the region of parameter values that support versioning. The equilibrium exists even 
when the heterogeneity among customers is low, because there is no versioning in the second period as all 
the basic version subscribers upgrade to the premium version.  In addition to lower heterogeneity, we also 
need the quality of new service to be sufficiently high, so that consumers have a higher incentive to 
upgrade to the premium version.   
Case (iii): 𝑃! ≤ 𝑃! + 𝑃! and !!! > 𝜃!.  
Similar to the previous case, the premium version is less expensive than buying the basic and the new 
service separately. However, when the price of new service is sufficiently high, such that  !!! > 𝜃!, some 
of the low type basic version subscribers are not interested in buying the new service. The higher type 
consumers, who are interested in the new service, may, however, upgrade to the premium version at a 
lower price, and get both the primary service and the new service. Therefore, no consumers buy the new 
service separately. This leads to three customers segments in the second period, as shown in Fig 4.   
Figure 4: Segmentation of consumers when 𝑷𝑯 ≤ 𝑷𝑳 + 𝑷𝑵 and 𝑷𝑵𝒒 > 𝜽𝟏. 
 
There is no expansion of the market in the second period, as those who did not buy in the first period also 
do not buy in the second period. Low type consumers who bought the basic version in the first period 
continue with the basic version. Basic version subscribers with sufficiently high 𝜃 > !!!  upgrade to the 
premium version. Based on these segments, the second stage payoff function of the monopolist can be 
expressed as follows: 
𝜋! = !!!!!!!! 𝑑𝜃 + !!!! 𝑑𝜃!!!! .                                                                                                                    (13) 
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The limit 𝜃! is inherited from the first stage, 𝜃! represents the type of threshold customer who is 
indifferent between buying the basic version and upgrading to the premium version. 𝜃! can be derived by 
solving the following utility equation: 
𝑈 𝜃!, 𝑣! − 𝑃! = 𝑈 𝜃!, 𝑣! + 𝜃!𝑞 − 𝑃!.                                                                                               (14) 
The solution to (14) yields an expression for 𝜃! as a function of the first period prices and the quality of 
new service, as follows: 
𝜃! = !!!!!!!!!!!! + !!!!!!!!(!!!!!!!).                                                                                                                     (15) 
The monopolist does not have a decision variable in the second period, as there no customers for the new 
service in this case. The second period profit is a function only of the first period prices for the primary 
services.  
Lemma 3 
The equilibrium with 𝑃! ≤ 𝑃! + 𝑃! and !!! > 𝜃! exists when the values of 𝜃! and !!!!!! are in the range 
described below:  
0 < !!!!!! < !!!!!!!! and  !!!!! !!! !!!!!! !!!!!!! < 𝜃! < !!! !!!!! !! !!!!! !!!!!! !!!!!!! .  
Similar to case (ii), the equilibrium exists even when the heterogeneity among consumers is lower than 
the average quality level of the primary services.  Note that segmentation fails when there is not sufficient 
heterogeneity among consumers. However, the quality level for the new service should be sufficiently 
small to ensure that the price for premium version is not too high, and there is still a segment of 
consumers buying the basic version.  
We compare the three cases to find any overlapping regions that support more than one type of 
equilibrium and compare the profits with the cases. We summarize the findings in Proposition 2.  
 
Proposition 2 
 
The regions that support each of the three cases that may arise at the equilibrium with discriminative 
bundling are non-exclusive. In the region where more than one type of equilibrium may exist:  
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a) Case (iii) is always dominated by case (i) 
b) Case (i) dominates case (ii) for all values of 𝑞 when 𝑣! > 3 − 5 𝜃!.  
c) Case (ii) dominates case (i) for all values of 𝑞 when 𝑣! > !"!!! 𝜃! and 
𝑣! < !!!!!!! !!!!! !!! !!!!!"!!!!!!!!! .  
d) For intermediate values of 𝑣! and 𝑣!, case (i) dominates case (ii) when 
!!!!!! < !! !!!!!"!!!!(!!!!!!)!! !!!!! !!!!!  .  
When the new service is bundled with only the premium version, it is always profitable for the 
monopolist to sell the new service separately in the second period. Case (iii) is always less profitable than 
case (i) because the price for the premium version is the same in both cases, but the monopolist is losing 
the revenue he can gain from selling the new service separately under case (iii). This result also indicates 
that pure bundling of the new service with the primary service is always less profitable than selling the 
new service separately in addition to bundling it with the premium version. Therefore it is profitable for 
the monopolist to sell the new service at a sufficiently low price such that there is a segment of consumers 
who either buy only the new service or buy both the basic version and the new service. However, when 
the quality of the basic version is sufficiently small, it is optimal for the monopolist to sell the premium 
version at a price sufficiently low that all basic version consumers upgrade to the premium version.  
First Stage Analysis: 
Given the optimal second stage profit as a function of the first period prices for the basic and premium 
versions, the monopolist can now choose the optimal prices for the basic and premium versions that 
maximize current and future profits. The first stage optimization problem of the monopolist can be 
expressed as follows: 
max!!,!! !!!!!!!! 𝑑𝜃 + !!!! 𝑑𝜃!!!! + 𝜋!.                                                                                                     (16) 
The result of the optimization is summarized in Proposition 1.  
Proposition 3 
Using discriminative mixed bundling, the monopolist charges the following prices for the basic and 
premium versions of the primary service and the new service: 
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(i) When 𝑣! > 3 − 5 𝜃! or  !!!!!! < !! !!!!!"!!!!(!!!!!!)!! !!!!! !!!!! . 𝑃! = !! 𝑣! 2𝜃! − 𝑣! . 𝑃! = !!! !!!!! !!!!!! !!!!! !!!!! !!!! !!!!!!!(!!! !!!!! ) . 𝑃! = ! !!!!! !!!!! !!!!! . 
(ii) When (𝑣! > !"!!! 𝜃!   𝑎𝑛𝑑  𝑣! < !!!!!!! !!!!! !!! !!!!!"!!!!!!!!! ) or 
!!!!!! > !! !!!!!"!!!!(!!!!!!)!! !!!!! !!!!! .  𝑃! = !! !!! !!!! !!! !!!!!! !!!!! . 𝑃! = !!!!! !!!! !!!! !!!!!! !!!!! . 𝑃! = !!!!!!!!!! . 
The primary difference between traditional bundling and bundling in the presence of versioning is that the 
premium version is more valuable than the basic version and the new service together. In contrast to the 
existing literature, a consumer cannot reproduce the bundle by buying the bundled products separately 
This allows for the premium version to be priced higher than the sum of the prices for the basic version 
and the new service. On the other hand, restricting the price of premium version to be lower than the sum 
of the prices for the basic version and the new service eliminates the segment of consumers who buy the 
basic version and the new service separately. However, it is always optimal for the monopolist to sell the 
new service separately to non-subscribers and subscribers to the basic version, or to both. We compare the 
prices and profits under the DB regime against the benchmark case of pricing the new service 
independently in the next section.  
3.4.3 Comparison of Equilibria 
In this subsection, we compare the equilibria of the two pricing strategies with respect to prices and 
profits.  
Proposition 4 
Using the superscripts DB and IP to represent the discriminative bundling and independent pricing 
strategies, the comparison of prices across the three regimes are as follows: 
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𝑃!!" ≥ 𝑃!!", 𝑃!!" > 𝑃!!",  𝑃!!" < 𝑃!!". 
The price charged for the basic version under the DB regime is either equal to or greater than the price 
charged under the IP regime. Specifically, the 𝑃! under the DB and IP regimes is the same when the 
quality level of the new service is low and equilibrium under the DB regime leads to 𝑃! > 𝑃! + 𝑃!. 
When the quality level of the new service is high, the equilibrium under the DB regime leads to case (ii), 
in which no customers buy the basic version in the second period. Therefore, the monopolist increases the 
price for the basic version, when compared to the IP regime, to encourage more consumers to upgrade to 
the premium version. The price for the premium version under the DB regime is higher than the price 
charged under the IP regime as the premium version receives an enhancement in the second period from 
the new service. On the other hand, the price of the new service is lower under the DB regime, as the 
potential market segment for the new service is limited to non-subscribers and subscribers to the basic 
version.   
Proposition 5 
The comparison of profits from using discriminative bundling and independent pricing yields the 
following result: 
𝜋!" < 𝜋!". 
Independent pricing is always more profitable than discriminative bundling when a consumer’s valuation 
for the new service is perfectly correlated with her valuation for the primary service. Due to price 
commitment, the monopolist chooses the bundle price that optimizes overall profits in the first and second 
periods. Using the DB strategy, the monopolist charges a higher price for the premium version when 
compared to the IP strategy as the premium version receives an enhancement in the second period due to 
the inclusion of new service. The monopolist begins charging a higher price for the premium version from 
the first period. As a result, fewer consumers buy the premium version in the first period when compared 
to the IP environment. In the second period, as bundling the new service makes the premium version 
more appealing, some basic version subscribers upgrade to the premium version, thereby increasing the 
segment of consumers buying the premium version. The reduction in the size of the segment of 
consumers buying the premium version in the first period is exactly equal to the increase in the second 
period, due to the linear form of valuation function for the new service. By bundling the new service at no 
additional cost, the monopolist is losing the revenue he can gain from selling the new service separately to 
the premium version subscribers. Due to the price commitment, the monopolist cannot price the premium 
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version at the optimal bundle price that can be obtained from optimizing just the current period profits. In 
order to balance the loss in market share for the premium version in the first period, the monopolist 
chooses a lower bundle price. As the consumer valuations for the new service are perfectly correlated 
with valuations for the primary service, the standalone price for the new service in the second period is 
also lower when compared to the price under the IP strategy. The decrease in the price of new service 
when compared to the IP strategy is given by !!!!, where 𝑟 = !!!!!!. However, the increase in the price of 
the premium version over the price under the IP strategy is equal to !!(!!!). The extent of decrease in the
price of new service and increase in the price of the premium version under the DB strategy depends on 
the ratio of the quality of new service and the difference in the quality levels of the basic and the premium 
versions. The lower price for the new service, combined with an incommensurate increase in the price of 
the premium version, leads to lower profits using the DB strategy, when compared to pricing the new 
service independently.   
3.5 EFFECT OF INDEPENDENT VALUATIONS AND THE NATURE OF RELATIONSHIP 
BETWEEN THE NEW AND THE PRIMARY SERVICE 
In the previous section, we assumed that all consumers agree on the quality level of a new service, 
differing only in their preference for the services offered by the monopolist. The form of valuation 
function that we consider for the new service yields a prefect correlation between consumer valuations for 
the new and the  primary service. This approach is suitable to describe new services that represent 
enhancements to the primary service and therefore consumer preferences for the new service are 
correlated with their preference for the primary service. For example, offering an analytics service or a 
social media feature may represent an enhancement to the primary CRM software.  However, for new 
services that represent a radically new functionality, consumers’ valuation for the new service may be 
independent of their valuation for primary service. For example, Salesforce introduced a new service 
called Force.com that allows companies to build apps for customers and employees. The new service is 
not directly related to the primary CRM software and consumers’ preference for the new service may be 
independent of their preference for the primary service. In addition to the degree of correlation between 
the new and the primary service, the new service can either complement or substitute the primary service 
depending on the nature of service. For example, consumers using the new service as a part of the 
premium version may derive a value that is different from the value derived by consumers buying the new 
service separately. The difference may be due to the value that can be gained from using the new service 
along with other features that are only offered in the premium version. For example, Salesforce bundles 
the new service Private App Exchange with higher versions of Sales Cloud that also include features that 
allow users to build custom apps. The new service may provide additional value to users of the premium 
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version, as it offers a platform upon which they can organize and manage access to apps they create using 
the premium version.  The difference in value gained by premium version and basic version buyers may 
even represent the disutility that a premium version subscriber can suffer from adding too many features 
in the premium version. In this section, we develop a modelling approach to analyze the effect of the 
nature of the relationship between the new and primary services on comparison pricing policies.  
Assuming that a buyer derives a different value from the new service when purchased separately and 
when offered as a part of the premium version, let 𝑞! represent the value of the new service when 
purchased separately and 𝑞! the value when offered as a part of the premium version. When 𝑞! > 𝑞!, the 
new service is more valuable when offered with the premium version and less valuable when sold 
separately to basic version subscribers and to non-subscribers. This is the case with new services that 
complement existing services. Similarly when 𝑞! < 𝑞!, the new service is less valuable when offered 
with the premium version and more valuable to basic version subscribers and to non-subscribers. This is 
the case with new services that substitute the features in the premium version. Using the same notation for 
prices as in the previous section, non-subscribers and subscribers to the basic version buy the new service 
if 𝑞! > 𝑃!.  
3.5.1 Independent Pricing Equilibrium 
As the valuation for new service is binary, the monopolist can select a price for the new service that either 
encourages all consumers to buy the new service, or only a segment of consumers, depending on the 
relative ordering of 𝑞! and 𝑞!.  When 𝑞! < 𝑞!, the monopolist can cover the entire market for the new 
service by charging 𝑃! = 𝑞!, or can sell only to the premium version subscribers by charging 𝑃! = 𝑞!. 
When 𝑞! > 𝑞!, the monopolist can sell the new service to all consumers by charging 𝑃! = 𝑞!, or can sell 
to a sub-segment by charging 𝑃! = 𝑞!. Considering all the different cases, the equilibrium with 
independent pricing is summarized in Proposition 6.  
Proposition 6 
When a consumer’s valuation for the new service is independent of her valuation for the primary service 
and the consumer may derive a higher or lower value from the new service when used along with the 
premium version, the equilibrium with independent pricing can be characterized as follows: 
(i) 𝑞! < 𝑞!:  
When 𝑞! > 𝑞! !!!!!!!!! !!!!! !!!!!!! .  
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𝑃! = !! 𝑣! 2𝜃! − 𝑣! . 𝑃! = !! 𝑣! 2𝜃! − 𝑣! . 𝑃! = 𝑞!. 
When  𝑞! < 𝑞! !!!!!!!!! !!!!! !!!!!!! . 𝑃! = !! 𝑣! 2𝜃! − 𝑣! . 𝑃! = !! −𝑞! − 𝑣!! + 2𝑣!𝜃! . 𝑃! = 𝑞!. 
 
(ii) 𝑞! > 𝑞!   
When 𝑞! > 𝑞! !!!!!!!!! !!!!! !!!!!!! . 𝑃! = !! 𝑣! 2𝜃! − 𝑣! . 𝑃! = !! 𝑣! 2𝜃! − 𝑣! . 𝑃! = 𝑞!. 
When 𝑞! < 𝑞! !!!!!!!!! !!!!! !!!!!!!  𝑃! = !! 𝑣! 2𝜃! − 𝑣! . 𝑃! = !! 𝑞! − 𝑣!! + 2𝑣!𝜃! . 𝑃! = 𝑞!. 
Depending on the nature of relationship between the new and the primary service, the equilibrium with 
independent pricing yields four different cases. When the monopolist prices the new service sufficiently 
low to cover the entire market, the price for the basic and the premium versions are independent of the 
valuation for the new service, and they are the same as the prices with pure versioning. When the 
monopolist sells the new service only to a sub-segment of consumers, depending on whether 𝑞! > 𝑞! or 𝑞! > 𝑞!, the prices for the basic and the premium versions are adjusted to account for the size of the 
segment buying the new service.  For example, in case (ii), the price of the premium version is lowered so 
that there is a larger segment of premium version consumers for the new service in the second period at 
price 𝑃! = 𝑞!.  
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3.5.2 Discriminative Bundling Equilibrium  
Unlike the IP regime, the relative ordering of the quality levels does not influence the price charged for 
the new service, as premium version consumers do not need to pay for the new service separately. As all 
consumers in the interval 0, 𝜃!  have a valuation equal to 𝑞! for the new service, the monopolist can 
either cover the entire market by charging a price 𝑃! = 𝑞! or not sell the new service separately by 
charging a higher price. The segmentation of consumers in the second period, after the introduction of 
new service, can be described by Fig 5.  
Figure 5: Segmentation of consumers in the second period under horizontal differentiation. 
 
There are four segments in the second period. Segment B consumers buy only the new service. Segment 
C is the group of consumers who buy both the basic version and the new service. Segment D is the 
segment of buyers who upgrade to the premium version, and Segment E consists of buyers who continue 
buying the premium version. A basic version subscriber upgrades to the premium version if 𝑈 𝜃!, 𝑣! +𝑞! − 𝑃! − 𝑃! > 𝑈 𝜃!, 𝑣! + 𝑞! − 𝑃!. The thresholds 𝜃! and 𝜃! are inherited from the first period and 
are a function only of the prices for the primary service. Using an approach similar to that described in 
Section 3, we derive the equilibrium with discriminative bundling, considering the more general case of 𝑃! > 𝑃! + 𝑃! that yields full segmentation.  
Proposition 7 
When a consumer’s valuation for the new service is independent of her valuation for the primary service 
and the consumer may derive a higher or lower value from the new service when used along with the 
premium version, following is the characterization of equilibrium for the DB regime, assuming 𝑃! > 𝑃! + 𝑃!: 
𝑃! = !! 𝑣! 2𝜃! − 𝑣! . 
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𝑃! = !!!!!! + !!! 2𝜃! − 𝑣! . 
𝑃! = 𝑞!. 
The equilibrium exists when one of the following conditions holds:  
a) 𝑞! < 𝑞! and   𝜃! > !!!!!!(!!!!!) + !!!!!! . 
b) 𝑞! > 𝑞! and 𝜃! > !!!!!!!(!!!!!) + !!!!!! .  
The price for the basic version remains the same as the price without bundling. The price for the premium 
version is higher than the price without bundling, and it depends on the distribution of valuations for the 
new service. The monopolist can capture the entire consumer surplus from the new service unlike the 
previous case in which valuations are perfectly correlated. The equilibrium characterization of the DB 
strategy is independent of the ordering of 𝑞!  and 𝑞!.  The equilibrium exists only when the heterogeneity 
among consumers is sufficiently high. The lower bound on 𝜃 is required to support segmentation, and to 
satisfy the assumption about prices, 𝑃! > 𝑃! + 𝑃!. The heterogeneity should be greater than the average 
quality level of the primary services due to the presence of idiosyncratic valuations for the new service.  
Specifically, when the valuation for the new service increases when compared to the difference in the 
quality levels of the basic and premium versions, the lower bound on 𝜃! is more restrictive. When the 
new service is less valuable when offered with the premium version, there should be sufficiently large 
heterogeneity, with respect to 𝜃, to justify a higher price for the premium version.   
3.5.3 Comparison of Equilibria 
Proposition 8 
The comparison of profits under the independent pricing and discriminative bundling regimes yields the 
following result when the valuation of new service is independent of the valuation for the primary service 
within a segment of consumers: 
𝜋!" > 𝜋!", when there is sufficiently large differential in the value realized from the new service when 
consumed as a part of the bundle and on its own, and there is sufficiently large heterogeneity among 
consumers with respect to the primary service.  
When consumers’ valuation for the new service is not perfectly correlated with that of the primary 
service, the comparison of profits under the DB, and the IP strategies is not completely unambiguous. 
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Discriminative bundling may lead to higher profits when compared to the IP strategy, when there is 
sufficiently large heterogeneity in consumers’ valuations for the primary service and the difference in the 
valuation of the new service between subscribers to the premium version and other customers, is 
sufficiently large. When the valuation for the new service is independent of the valuation for the primary 
service within a segment of consumers, the monopolist does not need to decrease the standalone price for 
new service, in order to attract the remaining customers. In fact, the monopolist can capture the complete 
surplus from consumers buying the new service separately in this formulation. The monopolist charges a 
higher price for the premium version in the first period when compared to the price charged under the IP 
regime and therefore sells the premium version to a smaller segment of consumers. However, he gains 
additional consumers for the premium version in the second period by offering the new service at no 
additional cost. This motivates some consumers to upgrade to the premium version. Unlike the case with 
perfect correlation, the number of consumers that the monopolist loses in the first period is not the same 
as the number of consumers that upgrade to the premium version in the second period. The difference 
depends on the quality levels 𝑞! and 𝑞!. Therefore, with independence in the valuations of the new and 
the primary service, the comparison of profits in the IP and the DB regimes is not unambiguous as it was 
in the case of perfect correlation. The comparison depends on the degree of complementarity or 
substitutability as given by the difference between 𝑞!  and 𝑞!, and the extent of heterogeneity among 
consumers. A greater heterogeneity in consumer valuations for the primary services leads to a larger 
segment of consumers buying the premium version, and a higher price differential between the basic and 
premium versions. Therefore, with sufficient large 𝜃!, the revenue gain that can be achieved using the 
DB strategy from charging a higher price for the premium version and encouraging a larger number of 
consumers to purchase the premium version, is greater than the revenue that is lost by offering the new 
service at no additional cost to premium version subscribers. When the new service is much more 
valuable to a basic version subscriber or a non-subscriber than it is to a premium version subscriber, it is 
more profitable for the monopolist under the IP strategy to sell only to the non-premium version 
subscribers at a higher price than selling to all consumers at a lower price. Using the DB strategy, 
however, the monopolist can continue to capture the surplus from non-premium version subscribers, 
while also charging a higher price for the premium version. Therefore when 𝑞!  is sufficiently greater than 𝑞! indicating a high degree of substitutability between the new and the primary service, the DB strategy is 
more profitable than the IP strategy. This result contradicts the findings in existing literature, where 
mixed bundling is not profitable when products are strong substitutes. The contradiction in results can be 
explained by the difference in the type of mixed bundling that we consider. In the existing literature, 
consumers who like one product more than the other have an option of buying their preferred product 
separately. In the current setting, the premium version is not sold separately outside the bundle. Therefore 
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consumers who have a high valuation for the premium version will end up buying the premium version at 
a higher price even if they have a low valuation for the new service.  
3.6 CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we provide insights on an important decision facing a multi-product firm, that of pricing 
new products or service extensions. The decision is complicated for a firm offering information goods or 
software services, which are often offered at more than one quality level. In such a setting, the service 
provider is often faced with a difficult choice of whether to sell the new service on its own or to bundle 
the new service with all or only certain versions of the existing services. We analyze two strategies 
commonly used in practice: Bundling the new service with only the higher versions of the existing service 
(Discriminative Bundling) and selling the new service separately on its own (Independent Pricing). In the 
absence of any marginal costs of offering the new service in addition to the existing service, we find that 
the optimal strategy depends on the nature of new service. When a new service represents an 
enhancement to the primary service and consumers’ valuation for the new and the primary service are 
highly correlated, bundling the new service with the premium version is less profitable than selling it 
separately to all consumers. When the new service represents a new feature that is not related to the 
primary service, and the value that a consumer derives from using the new service along with the 
premium version may be higher or lower than the value obtained by using the new service without the 
premium version, bundling the new service is more profitable than independent pricing under certain 
conditions. Specifically, when the heterogeneity in consumer valuations is sufficiently large and the 
difference in the value realized from using the new service with and without the premium version of the 
primary service is sufficiently large, bundling leads to higher profits, by capturing the consumer surplus 
more efficiently. Our results provide valuable and useful insights to firms offering information goods and 
software services, by laying out recommendations for the optimal pricing strategy to use, based on the 
nature of the new services and general customer distributions.   
Our work is a first step in the direction of analyzing ex-post bundling of new services with the 
existing versions of the primary service. We make several simplifying assumptions that may influence our 
results. The presence of factors such as competition, network effects, transaction costs, and consumer 
learning, in practice, may lead to different conclusions, and may explain practices in the industry that may 
seem sub-optimal in the context of our model. For example, we assume that there are no marginal costs 
associated with selling the new service on its own or in the bundle. However, the presence of transaction 
costs and asymmetry in the costs associated with delivering the primary service for basic and premium 
version subscribers may influence our results. We assume that consumers are completely aware of their 
valuations for the new service. Uncertainty with respect to consumer valuations may potentially make the 
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pricing problem dynamic in nature. We also assume certain functional forms to describe consumer 
valuations for the existing and new services; a different form of the valuation function for either of the 
services may influence our results. In addition, with the entry of new firms, cloud based software and 
information services industries are becoming increasingly competitive. Competition among service 
providers may be an important factor in the pricing decisions of new services. We assume that the firm 
holds a monopoly position in both the primary and new services. However, competition in either or both 
services may drive the firm towards a different pricing strategy. Innovations in service delivery and 
pricing models open fertile areas for future research, and some of the issues that we raise, may offer 
interesting directions for future research in multi-product pricing.  
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 APPENDIX 
Proofs for Essay 1 
 
Proof of Proposition 1: 
(i)  The second stage payoff function of the monopolist when he uses both intertemporal and behavioral 
price discrimination is given by (3). The first order conditions for 𝑃!! and 𝑃!! are as follows:  !!!!"!!!! = 𝑞! − 2𝑃!! + !!!!∗! = 0,  !!!!"!!!! = 𝜃∗ − 2𝑃!! + !!! = 0.          
The solution to the above equations yields the second stage equilibrium prices 𝑃!!∗  and 𝑃!!∗  as follows: 𝑃!!∗ = !!! + !!!!∗! ,                                                                                                                                   (A1) 𝑃!!∗ = !∗! + !!! .                                                                                                                                         (A2) 
The second stage profits can be expressed as: 𝜋!∗ = !!!∗ !!! + !!!!∗ !!!∗ !!!!! . 
We can express the first stage equilibrium price as a function of the second stage equilibrium prices by 
substituting the second period prices derived above, in the utility equation that defines the indifferent 
consumer of type 𝜃∗  (from (1) and (2)) as follows: 𝑃!! = 𝑃!!∗ + !!!!!!∗ !!∗ !!!! . 
Substituting 𝑃!! in the first stage payoff function (7) yields an optimization problem in 𝜃∗ as:   max!∗ 𝜋!" = !!!!∗!! 𝑃!!∗ + !!!!!!∗ !!∗ !!!! + !!!∗ !!! + !!!∗ ! !!!∗ !!∗!!!! .                                                         
Solving the first order condition for 𝜃∗ yields two roots. Choosing the root that satisfies the second order 
condition yields the solution for 𝜃∗ as follows: 
 𝜃∗ = !!! 13𝜃! − 28𝑞! + 2 97𝑞!! + 82𝜃!𝑞! + 𝜃!! .                                                                    (A3) 
In order to derive this solution we assume that all customer types engage in conditional buying. To satisfy 
this assumption, the second stage equilibrium price for returning customers 𝑃!!∗  (from (A1)) should 
satisfy the condition described in case (c) of the main text, specifically 𝜃! < 𝑃!!∗ < 𝜃∗ + 𝑞!. In addition, 
we need the conditions 0 < 𝜃∗ < 𝜃! and 0 < 𝑃!!∗ − !!! < 𝜃∗ to ensure that the market is not fully 
covered in the first and second stages. In summary, we need the following conditions to support this 
equilibrium.  
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1) 𝜃! < 𝑃!!∗ < 𝜃∗ + 𝑞!. 
2) 0 < 𝜃∗ < 𝜃!. 
3) 0 < 𝑃!!∗ − !!! < 𝜃∗.  
In order to satisfy the first two conditions, !!!! values should fall in the range given by !"! !"! < !!!! < !!. 
However, in this range of !!!! values  𝑃!!∗ − !!! < 0, contradicting the assumption of less than full market 
coverage in both periods.  Therefore, conditional buying by all returning customers does not occur at the 
equilibrium when there is less than full market coverage in both periods.  
 
(ii) Using a similar approach, we can derive the equilibrium with only behavioral (B) and only 
intertemporal (I) price discrimination regimes by substituting 𝑃!! = 𝑃!! and 𝑃!! = 𝑃!! = 𝑃!, 
respectively. Similar to the BI regime, we can show that under purely intertemporal price discrimination 
(I) regime, when there is less than full market coverage in both periods, conditional learning by all 
returning customers does not occur at the equilibrium. However, for purely behavioral price 
discrimination (B) regime, conditional buying by all returning customers is consistent with the 
assumption of less than full market coverage in both periods when 1.482 < !!!! < 1.62.  
 Proof of Proposition 2: 
(i), (ii) When the monopolist has full commitment power to set future prices, he announces the price to 
new and returning customers at the beginning of the first period. Assuming that the monopolist uses both 
behavioral and intertemporal price discrimination when he can commit to prices in both periods at the 
beginning of the game and that there is learning by all returning customers, the payoff function for the 
two periods is given by: max!!!,!!!,!!! (!!!!∗)!! 𝑃!! +    !!!!!!∗!!!!!!! 𝑑𝜃 +    !!!!!!! 𝑑𝑞𝑑𝜃!!!!!!!!!!∗ . 
We can solve the maximization problem in three variables by deriving the first order conditions as 
follows:  !!!"!!!! = (𝜃! − 𝜃∗) − !!∗!!!! 𝑃!! − 𝑃!! + !!!!! (𝑞! − 𝑃!! + 𝜃∗) = 0.                                                    (A4) !!!"!!!! = 𝜃∗ − 2𝑃!! + !!! − !!∗!!!! 𝑃!! − 𝑃!! + !!!!! (𝑞! − 𝑃!! + 𝜃∗) = 0.                                           (A5) !!!"!!!! = 𝜃! − 𝜃∗ 𝑞! − 2𝑃!! + !!!!∗! − !!∗!!!! 𝑃!! − 𝑃!! + !!!!! (𝑞! − 𝑃!! + 𝜃∗) = 0.                 (A6) 
The expressions for !!∗!!!!, !!∗!!!!and !!∗!!!! can be obtained from the utility equation defining the indifferent 
consumer that is derived from (6). Solving (A4), (A5) and (A6) simultaneously yields the equilibrium 
prices in terms of 𝜃∗as follows: 
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𝑃!!∗ = !!! + !!! .                                                                                                                                       (A7) 𝑃!!∗ = !!!!∗! . 𝑃!!∗ = 𝑃!!∗ + !!!!!!∗ !!∗ !!!! . 
However, to support learning by all returning customers, 𝜃! < 𝑃!!∗ < 𝜃∗ + 𝑞! . The expression for 𝑃!!∗  in 
(A7) is inconsistent with the inequality 𝑃!!∗ > 𝜃! for any 𝜃∗ > 0. Hence with less than full coverage it is 
impossible for this equilibrium to arise.  
 
Considering a regime with conditional learning by the lower tail only yields the payoff functions:  max!!!,!!!,!!! (!!!!∗)!! 𝑃!! +    !!!!!!∗!!!!!!! 𝑑𝜃 +    !!!!!!! 𝑑𝑞𝑑𝜃!!!!!!!!!!!∗ + !!!!!!! 𝑑𝜃!!!!! , 
where the relationship between 𝑃!! and 𝑃!! ensures that a consumer of type 𝜃∗ is indifferent between 
buying in period 1 or postponing consumption to period 2. Hence,  𝑃!! = 𝑃!! + !!!!!!!!∗ !!!! . 
Substituting the expression for 𝑃!! back into the objective, we obtain a maximization problem in 𝑃!! ,𝑃!! 
and 𝜃∗. Optimizing with respect to the three variables yields: 𝑃!!∗ = !!! + !!! ,                                                                                                                                      (A8) 𝑃!!∗ = !!!!!! !"!!!" , 𝜃∗ = !"!!!!! !! !"!" .                                                                                                                            (A9) 
However to sustain an equilibrium with expansion of the market in the second period (i.e., 𝑃!!∗ < 𝑃!!∗ ) it 
is necessary that 𝑃!!∗ − !!! < 𝜃∗, which is inconsistent with (A8) and (A9). Hence, 𝑃!!∗ = 𝑃!!∗  and no new 
consumers are attracted to the market in the second period. The choice of the monopolist reduces, 
therefore, to a choice of two prices: price to new customers 𝑃! and price to returning customers 𝑃!. This 
choice is equivalent to the one facing the monopolist in the uni-dimensional behavioral regime.  
 
When there is conditional buying only by the lower tail of customers, the payoff function for the two 
periods is given by: 𝜋! = (!!!!∗)!! 𝑃! +    !!!!!! 𝑑𝑞!!!!!!!!!∗ 𝑑𝜃 + !!!! 𝑑𝜃!!!! . max!!,!! (!!!!∗)!! 𝑃! + 𝑃! 𝑃! − 𝜃∗ 𝑞! − 𝑃! + !!!!∗! + 𝜃! − 𝑃! 𝑃!.                                         (A10)                  
Based on the consumer utility equation, we can express the relationship between the first and second 
period price as follows: 
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𝑃! = 𝜃∗ + !!! + !!!!!!!∗ !!!! .                                                                                                                (A11) 
Substituting the expression for 𝑃! from (A11) in the profit function (A10), we can write the first stage 
maximization problem in two variables 𝑃! and 𝜃∗ as follows: max!!,!∗   (!!!!∗)!! 𝜃∗ + !!! + !!!!!!!∗ !!!! + 𝑃! 𝑃! − 𝜃∗ 𝑞! − 𝑃! + !!!!∗! + 𝜃! − 𝑃! 𝑃!. 
The first order conditions in 𝑃! and 𝜃∗ can be derived as follows: !!!!!! = 𝜃! − 2𝑃! + !! !!!!!!!∗!! + !!!!∗ !!!!!! !!∗!!! − !!!!∗ !!!!!!!∗!! .                                       (A12) !!!!!∗ = − 𝜃∗ + !!! + !!!!!!!∗ !!!! + 𝜃! − 𝜃∗ 1 + !!!!!!!∗!! − !! !!!!!!!∗!! .                              (A13) 
Solving the first order conditions (A12) and (A13) yields the solution for second period price 𝑃!∗ and the 
threshold customer 𝜃∗ as reported in Proposition 2. We choose the solution for 𝑃!∗ and 𝜃∗ to satisfy the 
second order conditions. 
The solution for 𝑃!∗ and 𝜃∗ should satisfy the following conditions that are required to ensure conditional 
learning only by the lower tail of returning customers and less than full market coverage.  
1) 𝑃!∗ < 𝜃!. 
2) 𝜃∗ < 𝑃!∗ < 𝜃∗ + 𝑞!. 
3) 0 < 𝜃∗ < 𝜃!. 
Condition (1) and (2) are always satisfied by the solution for 𝑃!∗ and 𝜃∗ for 𝜃∗ > 0. The condition 𝜃∗ > 0 
is valid only when  !!!! < !!! !.  
(iii) Substituting the solution for prices back into (A10) yields the expected profits. 
(iv) It is easy to demonstrate that 𝑃!∗ > 𝑃!∗.  
 
Proof of Proposition 3:  
(i), (ii) and (iii) The second stage payoff function when there is active learning only by the lower tail of 
the distribution of consumers from is as follows: 𝜋!!" = !!!!!!∗!!!!!!! 𝑑𝜃 +    !!! !!!!! 𝑑𝑞!!!!!!!!!!!∗ 𝑑𝜃 + !!!!! 𝑑𝜃!!!!! .                   
The first order conditions can be derived as follows: !!!!"!!!! = 𝜃∗ + !!! − 2𝑃!! = 0.                                                                                                                 (A14) !!!!!!!!! = 𝜃! − 2𝑃!! + !!! !!!!!!!!∗!! + !!!!!∗ !!!!!!! !!∗!!! .                                                                (A15) 
	  
	  
66	  
Solving the first order conditions (A14) and (A15) yields the solution for 𝑃!!∗  and 𝑃!!∗  as reported in 
Proposition 3. Using the first order condition (A14) and (A15), it is possible to express the second stage 
optimized profits as: 𝜋!∗ = !!!∗ !!! + !!!∗ ! !!!∗ !!∗!!!! . 
The relationship between second stage optimal prices and the first period price 𝑃!! can be obtained from 
the utility equation for the indifferent consumer described in (6): 𝑃!! = 𝑃!!∗ + !!!!!!∗ !!∗ !!!!                                                                                                                      (A16) 
Using this expression for  𝑃!!, the first stage optimization problem can be written as follows: 
 max!∗ 𝜋!" = !!!!∗!! 𝑃!!∗ + !!!!!!∗ !!∗ !!!! + !!!∗ !!! + !!!∗ ! !!!∗ !!∗!!!! .                                                      (A17) 
Substituting the solution for 𝑃!!∗  and 𝑃!!∗  from the second stage optimization in (A17) leads to a 
maximization problem in just one variable 𝜃∗. The first order condition in terms of 𝜃∗ can be expressed as 
follows: !! !!!!∗!! + !!!!!!!!∗ !!!!!!!!∗!! !!!!!!!∗ !!!!∗!! − !!!!!!!!∗ !!!!!!!!∗!  !!!! = 0                                          (A18) 
In order to support conditional learning only by the lower tail of experienced customers and less than full 
market coverage in the BI regime, we need additional constraints on the second period price to new 
customers, 𝑃!!∗ , in addition to the constraints on 𝑃!!∗  and 𝜃∗ that we discussed in the proof of Proposition 
2. First, we require  𝑃!!∗ > !!!   to ensure that there is less than full market coverage in the second period. 
Second, 𝑃!!∗ < 𝜃∗ + !!!   is required to ensure that new customers will find it attractive to buy in the 
second period. It is obvious from the solution for 𝑃!!∗ ,  that the latter condition is always true.   
To ensure the conditions necessary to support this equilibrium, the following inequalities on 𝜃∗ have to be 
satisfied:  
1) 𝑃!!∗ > !!! => 𝜃∗ > !!! . 
2) 𝑃!!∗ < 𝜃! => 𝜃∗ < 3𝜃! − 2𝑞!. 
3) 𝜃∗ < 𝑃!!∗ < 𝜃∗ + 𝑞! =>   𝜃∗ > !!! − !! 𝑞!. 
4) 0 < 𝜃∗ < 𝜃!. 
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Combining all the four conditions, the lower and upper bounds on 𝜃∗ can be expressed as: 𝑀𝑎𝑥 !!! , !!! −!! 𝑞! < 𝜃∗ < 𝑀𝑖𝑛 𝜃! , 3𝜃! − 2𝑞! . This can be simplified to indicate the range of parameter values and 
the corresponding bounds on 𝜃∗ as below: 
a) 𝐹𝑜𝑟   !!!! < !! , !!! − !! 𝑞! < 𝜃∗ < 𝜃!.   
b) 𝐹𝑜𝑟   !! < !!!! < 1, !!! < 𝜃∗ < 𝜃!. 
c) 𝐹𝑜𝑟  1 < !!!! < !! , !!! < 𝜃∗ < 3𝜃! − 2𝑞!. 
We can now evaluate the first order condition for 𝜃∗ at the lower bound (LB) and upper bound (UB) and 
derive the range of !!!! values that support this equilibrium. If  !!!"!!∗   !" > 0 , the optimized solution for  𝜃∗ 
satisfies the constraint that it is bigger than LB. If  !!!"!!∗   !" < 0, the optimized solution for 𝜃∗ satisfies 
the constraint that it is smaller than UB.  
a) When !!!! < !!  , !!!"!!∗ < 0  at the upperbound 𝜃∗ = 𝜃!   for all values of  !!!!   > 0. !!!"!!∗ > 0  at the lower bound 𝜃∗ = !!! − !! 𝑞!, for all values of 0 < !!!! < !!.  
 
b) When !! < !!!! < 1, !!!"!!∗ > 0  at the lower bound 𝜃∗ = !!! , for !! < !!!! < 0.8322 and the upper bound is the same as the 
previous case.  
c) When  1 < !!!! < !! ,  
The lower bound does not satisfy the first order condition and therefore this range of !!!! values does not 
support the equilibrium.  
Combining all the three scenarios, the equilibrium with behavioral and intertemporal price discrimination 
exists only if 0 < !!!! < 0.8322.  
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(iv) From (A16) it follows immediately that 𝑃!! > 𝑃!!. The comparison of 𝑃!! and 𝑃!! is more 
involved. However after some algebraic manipulations it can be established that 𝑃!! > 𝑃!! in the range 
of feasible values of  !!!!.  
Proof of Proposition 4: 
(i), (ii) and (iii) Under the behavioral price discrimination regime, there is no change in the price to new 
customers in the second period leading to 𝑃!! = 𝑃!!. Therefore the second stage payoff function is just 
the profit that can be obtained from returning customers. 𝜋!! = !!! !!!! 𝑑𝑞!!!!!!!!!∗ 𝑑𝜃 + !!!! 𝑑𝜃!!!! .  
The first order condition with respect to the second period price 𝑃! is the same as first order condition 
(A15) in the BI regime. Solving the first order condition leads to the solution for 𝑃!∗ as reported in the 
Proposition. The second period optimized profits can be expressed as: 𝜋!∗ = !!∗! !!∗!!∗!!!! . 
The relationship between second stage optimal price 𝑃!∗ and the first period price 𝑃! can be obtained from 
the utility equation for the indifferent consumer described in (12): 
 𝑃! = 𝜃∗ + !!! + !!!!!∗!!∗ !!!! . 
Using this expression for  𝑃!, the first stage optimization problem can be written as follows: 
 max!∗ 𝜋! = !!!!∗!! 𝜃∗ + !!! + !!!!!∗!!∗ !!!! + !!∗! !!∗!!∗!!!! .  
Substituting the solution for 𝑃!∗ from the second stage optimization leads to a maximization problem in 
one variable 𝜃∗. The first order condition in terms of 𝜃∗ can be expressed as follows: 𝜃! − 2𝜃∗ − !!! + !!!!!∗!!∗ !!!!!∗!!∗!! !!!∗!!!∗ !!!!∗!! − !!!!!∗!!∗ !!!!!∗!!∗!  !!!! = 0                                   (A19) 
Following a similar approach to the one used in the proof of Proposition 3 for the BI regime, we can write 
the conditions on 𝑃!∗ and  𝜃∗ that are required to support conditional learning by only the lower tail of 
returning customers and less than full market coverage in both periods. Notice that there are fewer 
conditions to support the B regime as there is no market expansion in the second period.  Substituting the 
solution for 𝑃!∗, the equilibrium conditions can be expressed as follows:  
1) 𝑃!∗ < 𝜃! => 𝜃∗ < 3𝜃! − 2𝑞!. 
2) 𝜃∗ < 𝑃!∗ < 𝜃∗ + 𝑞! => 𝜃∗ > !!! − !! 𝑞!. 
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3) 0 < 𝜃∗ < 𝜃!. 
Combining all the four conditions, the lower and upper bounds on 𝜃∗ can be expressed as: !!! − !! 𝑞! <𝜃∗ < 𝑀𝑖𝑛 𝜃! , 3𝜃! − 2𝑞! . This can be simplified to indicate the range of parameter values and the 
corresponding bounds on 𝜃∗ as below: 
a) 𝐹𝑜𝑟   !!!! < !! , !!! − !! 𝑞! < 𝜃∗ < 𝜃!.   
b) 𝐹𝑜𝑟   !! < !!!! < 1, 0 < 𝜃∗ < 𝜃!. 
c) 𝐹𝑜𝑟  1 < !!!! < !! , 0 < 𝜃∗ < 3𝜃! − 2𝑞!. 
We can now evaluate the first order condition at each of the bounds and derive the range of !!!! values that 
support this equilibrium.  
a) When !!!! < !!  , !!!"!!∗ < 0  at the upperbound 𝜃∗ = 𝜃!   for all values of  !!!!   > 0. !!!"!!∗ > 0  at the lower bound 𝜃∗ = !!! − !! 𝑞!, for all values of 0 < !!!! < !!.  
b) When !! < !!!! < 1, !!!"!!∗ > 0  at the lower bound 𝜃∗ = 0, for !! < !!!! < 1 and the upper bound is the same as in the previous 
case.  
c) When  1 < !!!! < !! ,  
The lower bound is the same as in the previous case.  !!!"!!∗ < 0 at the upper bound  𝜃∗ = 3𝜃! − 2𝑞!    for 1 < !!!! < 1.47588.  
Combining all the three scenarios, the equilibrium with behavioral price discrimination exists only if 0 < !!!! < 1.47588.  
(iv) The comparison of the prices yields that 𝑃! > 𝑃! for all !!!! values that support the equilibrium.  
Proof of Proposition 5: 
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(i), (ii) and (iii) Under the Intertemporal price discrimination regime, both new and returning customers 
are offered the same price in the second period leading to  𝑃!! = 𝑃!! = 𝑃!. Therefore the second stage 
payoff function is the sum of profit from new and returning customers as expressed below: 
𝜋!! = !!!!!∗!!!!!! 𝑑𝜃 + !!! !!!! 𝑑𝑞!!!!!!!!!∗ 𝑑𝜃 + !!!! 𝑑𝜃!!!! .  
The first order condition with respect to the second period price 𝑃! can be derived as follows: !!!!!!! = 𝜃∗ − 2𝑃! + !!! + !! !!!!!!!∗!! + !!!!∗ !!!  !!! !!∗!!! + 𝜃! − 2𝑃! = 0.  
Using this first order condition, the optimized second stage profits can be written as:  𝜋!∗ = !!∗! !!!!!∗!!∗!!!! . 
The relationship between second stage optimal price 𝑃!∗ and the first period price 𝑃! can be obtained from 
the utility equation for the indifferent consumer as follows (from (13) and (14)): 
 𝑃! = 𝑃!∗ + !!!!!∗!!∗ !!!!                       
Using this expression for  𝑃!, the first stage optimization problem can be written as follows: 
 max!∗ 𝜋! = !!!!∗!! 𝑃!∗ + !!!!!∗!!∗ !!!! + !!∗! !!!!!∗!!∗!!!! .                                                                   (A20) 
Substituting the solution for 𝑃!∗ from the second stage optimization in (A20) leads to a maximization 
problem in one variable 𝜃∗. The first order condition in terms of 𝜃∗ can be expressed as follows: 
!!!!!∗!!!∗!!!∗!!!! !!!!∗!! + !!!!!∗!!∗ !!!!!∗!!∗!! !!!∗!!!∗!!!! !!!!∗!! − !!!!!∗!!∗ !!!!!∗!!∗!  !!!! = 0                          (A21) 
Similar to the BI and B regimes, we can write the conditions on 𝑃!∗ and  𝜃∗ that are required in order to 
support conditional learning only by the lower tail of returning customers and less than full market 
coverage in both periods. In addition to the constraints on 𝑃!∗ that ensure conditional learning only by the 
lower tail of returning customers and an interior solution for 𝜃∗, we also require 𝑃!∗ > !!!  and 𝑃!∗ < 𝜃∗+!!!  
to ensure that the price to new customers is not too high and that the market expansion does not lead to  
complete coverage. Substituting the solution for 𝑃!∗, the equilibrium conditions can be expressed as 
follows:  
1) 𝑃!∗ > !!! => 𝜃∗ > 𝑞! − !! 𝑞! 8𝜃! − 3𝑞! . 
2) 𝜃∗ < 𝑃!∗ < 𝜃∗ + !!! => !!" 𝜃! − !!" 𝑞! < 𝜃∗ < !!! + !!! .  
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3) 𝑃!∗ < 𝜃! => 𝜃∗ < 3𝜃! − 𝑞!. 
4) 0 < 𝜃∗ < 𝜃!. 
Combining all the four conditions, the lower and upper bounds on 𝜃∗ can be expressed as: !!! − !! 𝑞! <𝜃∗ < 𝑀𝑖𝑛 𝜃! , 3𝜃! − 2𝑞! . This can be simplified to indicate the range of parameter values and the 
corresponding bounds on 𝜃∗ as below: 
a) 𝐹𝑜𝑟   !!!! < !! , !!" 8𝜃! − 7𝑞! < 𝜃∗ < !!! + !!! .   
b) 𝐹𝑜𝑟   !! < !!!! < 2, 𝑞! − !! 𝑞! 8𝜃! − 3𝑞! < 𝜃∗ < !!! + !!! . 
We can now evaluate the first order condition at each of the bounds and derive the range of !!!! values that 
support this equilibrium.  
a) When !!!! < !!  , !!!!!∗ < 0  at the upperbound 𝜃∗ = !!! + !!!   for all values of  !!!!   > 0. !!!!!∗ > 0  at the lower bound 𝜃∗ = !!" 8𝜃! − 7𝑞! , for all values of !!!! > 0.  
b) When !! < !!!! < 2, !!!!!∗ > 0  at the lower bound 𝜃∗ = 𝑞! − !! 𝑞! 8𝜃! − 3𝑞! , for !! < !!!! < 1.28367 and the upper bound 
is the same as in the previous case.  
Therefore, the only condition that restricts the range of !!!! values that support intertemporal price 
discrimination regime is 𝑃!∗ > !!! . The equilibrium with intertemporal price discrimination exists only if 0 < !!!! < 1.28367.  
(iv) The comparison of prices is obvious from the requirement that a consumer of type 𝜃∗ is indifferent 
between buying in periods1 and 2.  
Proof of Proposition 6: 
(i) and (ii): We utilize the first order conditions to compare the three regimes in terms of profits and the 
extent of market coverage. We first compare 𝜃∗ in the BI and B regimes.  
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In order to prove 𝜃∗!" > 𝜃∗!, it is sufficient to show that !!!!!∗ !∗!!∗!" < 0 in the range of parameter 
values that support the BI and B regimes.  
!!!!!∗ !∗!!∗!" = 𝜃! − 2𝜃∗!" − !!! + !!!!!!∗ !!∗!" !!!!!!∗ !!∗!" !!!!∗!"!! !!!!∗ !!!∗!" − !!!!!!∗ !!∗!" !!!!!!∗ !!∗!"!  !!  . 
But from (A18), we know that !!!!!!∗ !!∗!" !!!!!!∗ !!∗!" !!!!∗!"!! !!!!∗ !!!∗!" − !!!!!!∗ !!∗!" !!!!!!∗ !!∗!"!  !!!! =− !! 𝜃! − 𝜃∗!" . Therefore !!!!!∗ !∗!!∗!" , can be simplified as follows: 
!!!!!∗ !∗!!∗!" = 𝜃! − 2𝜃∗!" − !!! − !! 𝜃! − 𝜃∗!" = !!! − !!! − !! 𝜃∗!". 
!!!!!∗ !∗!!∗!" < 0 when 𝜃∗!" > !!!!!! . We can show that !!!!!!  is smaller than the lower bounds for 𝜃∗!" 
that support the BI regime leading to the conclusion that 𝜃∗!" > !!!!!!  for all parameter values that 
support the equilibrium. As a result, 𝜃∗! < 𝜃∗!". We can use a similar approach to demonstrate that 𝜃∗! < 𝜃∗!". The comparison of 𝜃∗! and 𝜃∗! is more complicated, and we therefore, perform the 
comparison using numerical results reported in Table 1.  
Comparison of profits: 
We can evaluate the profit in the B regime at 𝜃 = 𝜃∗!". Since 𝜃∗!" > 𝜃∗!, 𝜋!!!!∗!" < 𝜋∗!. If we can 
show that 𝜋∗!" < 𝜋!!!!!" unambiguously for the range of parameter values that support the equilibrium, 
it follows that 𝜋∗!" < 𝜋∗!.  𝜋∗!" − 𝜋!!!!!" = !!!!∗!"!! !∗!"! + !!! − 𝜃∗!" − !!! + !!! !∗!"! + !!! !.                                           (A22) 
Expression (A21) can be simplified as follows:  𝜋∗!" − 𝜋!!!!!" = !∗!"! + !!! !! 𝜃∗!" − 𝜃! + !!! . 𝜋∗!" − 𝜋!!!!!" < 0  𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑛  𝜃∗!" < !! 𝜃! − !!! .  
We can show that !!!"!!∗   !∗!"!!!!!!!!! < 0  in the range of !!!! values that support the BI regime, thereby 
implying that 𝜃∗!" < !! 𝜃! − !!!  and 𝜋∗!" < 𝜋!!!!!".  
The comparison of 𝜋∗! and 𝜋∗! is more complicated, and we therefore, perform the comparison using 
numerical results reported in Table 1.  
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Proof of Proposition 7: 
When the monopolist can commit to setting the same price in both periods, the common price 𝑃! can be 
expressed in terms of 𝜃∗ using the customer utility equation as follows: 𝜃∗ + !!! − 𝑃! + !!!!!!!∗ !!!! = 0.                                                                                                           
This is a quadratic equation with two roots. We choose the root that satisfies the condition that 𝑃!∗ < 𝜃∗ +𝑞!, implying that type 𝜃∗ sometimes buys a second time.   𝑃!∗ = 2𝑞! − 2𝑞! + 𝜃∗.                                                                                                                        (A23) 
Assuming conditional learning by all, the payoff function can be expressed as follows: max!∗ 𝜋! = 𝜃! − 𝜃∗ 𝑃!∗ + !!∗!!!! 𝑑𝑞!!!!∗!!!!∗!∗ 𝑑𝜃.                                                                               (A24) 
Substituting the solution for 𝑃!∗, (A24) represents a maximization problem in one variable 𝜃∗. Solving the 
first order conditions yields a solution for 𝜃∗ that contradicts the assumption of conditional learning by all 
returning customers.   
Therefore, we now solve the equilibrium assuming conditional learning by the lower tail of returning 
customers only. The expression for 𝑃!∗ in terms of 𝜃∗ (from (A23)) remains the same. However, the 
payoff function can now be expressed as:  max!∗ 𝜋! = 𝜃! − 𝜃∗ 𝑃!∗ + !!∗!!!! 𝑑𝑞!!!!∗!!!!∗!∗ 𝑑𝜃 + !!∗!! 𝑑𝜃!!!!∗ .  
Substituting the expression for 𝑃!∗ from (A23) and solving the first order conditions for 𝜃∗ yields the 
equilibrium reported in Proposition 8. In order to support the equilibrium with conditional learning only 
by the lower tail of returning customers, we need 𝜃∗ < 𝑃!∗ < 𝜃∗ + 𝑞! and 𝑃!∗ < 𝜃!. We can show that the 
solution 𝑃!∗ = !!! + !!!  satisfies these conditions for  0 < !!!! < 1.488.  
Proof of Proposition 8: 
(i), (ii) When there is full coverage of the market in the first period, 𝜃∗ = 0. All three pricing regimes are 
similar, as there are no new customers in the second stage. The monopolist’s pricing problem reduces to 
choosing a first period price and second period that is common to all customers. We derive the 
equilibrium, assuming conditional buying by all returning customers.  
The second period payoff function when there is conditional learning by all customers can be expressed 
as follows: max!! 𝜋! = !!!!!! 𝑑𝑞𝑑𝜃!!!!!!!!! . 
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Solving the first order condition as given below yields the solution for 𝑃! as reported in Proposition 7.  !!!!!!! = 𝑞! − 2𝑃! + !!! .                                                                                                                         (A25) 
In order to support conditional buying by all returning customers, we need 𝜃! < 𝑃! < 𝑞!. The solution 
for 𝑃! satisfies this condition for  !!!! > !!. Therefore under full market coverage, conditional buying by all 
returning customers occurs at the equilibrium when !!!! > !!.  
The first period price can be derived directly from the consumer utility equation as follows: 
𝑃!∗ = !!! + !!! !!!! !!!! .                                                                                                                             (A26) 
From (A25) and (A26), the expected profit under the equilibrium can be expressed as follows: 
𝜋 = !!! + !!! !!!! !!!! + !!! !!! + !!! ! = !"!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!"!! . 
The comparison of prices yields that 𝑃!∗ > 𝑃!∗  for  !!!! < 2.9.  
For  !!!! < !!, only the lower tail of customers engages in conditional buying and the upper tail of 
customers buys the service again irrespective of their 𝑞 realization. In this case, the second stage payoff 
function of the monopolist can be expressed as follows: 
max!! 𝜋! = !!!!!! 𝑑𝑞!!!!!!! 𝑑𝜃 + !!!! 𝑑𝜃!!!! . 
Solving the first order condition yields the solution for 𝑃! as reported in Proposition 7.  
In order to support conditional buying by the lower tail of customers only, we require  0 < 𝑃! < 𝑞! and 𝑃! < 𝜃!. The solution for 𝑃! satisfies the two conditions when  1.47588 < !!!! < !!.  
The first period price derived from the customer utility equation is given by the following expression: 
𝑃!∗ = !!! + !!! !!!!!! !!!! .  
Substituting the two prices, yields the equilibrium profit as reported in the Proposition.  
(iii) When the monopolist has commitment power to announce future prices and assuming conditional 
buying by all, the equilibrium can be derived by solving the payoff function as follows: 
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max!! 𝜋! = !!! + !!!!! !!!! + !!!!!! 𝑑𝑞𝑑𝜃!!!!!!!!! . 
Solving the optimization problem yields the solution for 𝑃!∗. Substituting this solution in the customer 
utility equation yields the first period price 𝑃!∗ .  
However, we can show the solution for 𝑃!∗ does not satisfy the conditions required for conditional buying 
by all customers, namely 𝜃! < 𝑃!∗ < 𝑞!. Therefore we derive the equilibrium with conditional learning 
by the lower tail of customers only. We can write the optimization problem as follows: 
max!! 𝜋! = 𝜃! !!! + !!!!! !!!! + !!!!!! 𝑑𝑞!!!!!!!!! 𝑑𝜃 + !!!! 𝑑𝜃!!!!!! .  
Solving the first order condition yields the solution for 𝑃!∗ as reported in Proposition 7. Substituting the 
solution for 𝑃!∗ in the utility equation yields the optimal first period price. A comparison of prices yields 
that 𝑃!∗ > 𝑃!∗ for  !!!! > 1.13. Without commitment, full coverage arises when !!!! > 1.43. Hence, with 
commitment 𝑃!∗ > 𝑃!∗ whenever full coverage arises (with or without commitment).  
Proof of Proposition 9: 
When there is perfect correlation between consumer’s valuation of the basic features 𝜃 and the new 
features 𝑞, there is no uncertainty associated with the valuation of new features. The value of new features 
to a consumer of type 𝜃 is given by 𝜃 !!!!. We can, therefore, write the utility equation for a consumer of 
type 𝜃∗as follows: 
2𝜃∗ 1 + !!!! − 𝑃!! − 𝑃!! = 𝜃∗ 1 + !!!! − 𝑃!!.                                                                               (A27) 
(i) Equilibrium with Commitment Power: 
Assuming that the monopolist uses both behavioral and intertemporal price discrimination (BI) regimes, 
the payoff function for the two periods can be expressed as follows: 𝜋! = !!!!∗!! 𝑃!! + 𝑃!! + !∗!!!! 𝑃!!. 
From the utility equation (A27), we can express the relationship between the prices and 𝜃∗ as follows: 
𝜃∗ = !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! . 
Similarly 𝜃 can be expressed as 𝜃 = !!!!!!!!! . 
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Substituting the expressions for 𝜃∗ and 𝜃, the optimization problem in 𝑃!! ,𝑃!! and 𝑃!! can be written as: max!!!,!!!!!!, 𝜃! − !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!! + !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!! . 
Optimizing with respect to the prices, yields the following results: 𝑃!! + 𝑃!! = 𝜃! + 𝑞!,  𝑃!! = !!!!!!!! , which leads to the result 𝜃∗ = 𝜃, implying there are no new customers in the second 
stage.  
Substituting the optimal prices in the payoff functions yields the expected profit with commitment power: 𝐸𝜋∗ = !!!!!! .  
(ii) Equilibrium without Commitment Power: 
In the BI regime, the second stage payoff function for the monopolist can be expressed as follows: 
𝜋! = !!!!! 𝜃∗ − !!!!!!!!! + !!!!! 𝜃! − 𝜃∗   𝑖𝑓  𝑃!! ≤ 𝜃∗ 1 + !!!!                     !!!!! 𝜃∗ − !!!!!!!!! + !!!!! 𝜃! − !!!!!!!!!   𝑖𝑓𝑃!! ≥ 𝜃∗ 1 + !!!!      
Optimizing with respect to 𝑃!! and 𝑃!! yields the solution for second period prices as follows: 
𝑃!!∗ = 𝜃∗ 1 + !!!!   𝑖𝑓𝑃!! ≤ 𝜃∗ 1 + !!!!   !!!!!!   𝑖𝑓  𝑃!! ≥ 𝜃∗ 1 + !!!!                .                                                                                        (A28) 
𝑃!!∗ = !∗! 1 + !!!! .                                                                                                                                (A29) 
From the utility equation that defines the indifferent consumer (A27), we can express the relationship 
between the first and second period prices as follows: 𝑃!! = 𝑃!!∗ − 𝑃!!∗ + 𝜃∗ 1 + !!!! .  
Substituting the expression for 𝑃!!∗  and 𝑃!!∗  from (A28) and (A29), the first period price can be derived as 
follows: 𝑃!! = !∗! 1 + !!!! .  
	  
	  
77	  
Since 𝑃!! = 𝑃!!∗ , there are no new customers in the second stage and the utility equation defining the 
indifferent customer can be expressed as :  2𝜃∗ 1 + !!!! − 𝑃!! − 𝑃!!∗ = 0,  
which leads to the solution for first period price 𝑃!! = 𝜃∗ 1 + !!!! .  
Substituting 𝑃!! and 𝑃!!∗ , the first stage payoff function can be expressed as follows: max!∗ !!!!∗!! 2𝜃∗ 1 + !!!! . 
Optimizing with respect to 𝜃∗ yields the solution 𝜃∗ = !!! . Substituting this solution yields the expected 
profit in the BI regime as follows: 𝐸𝜋∗ = !!!!!! .  
We can show that the optimal prices and the expected profit remain the same in the region 𝜃∗ < !!! .  
Using a similar approach, we can show that the intertemporal (I) and behavioral (B) price discrimination 
regimes are equivalent and lead to the same profit as the first best case.  
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Proofs for Essay 2 
Proof of Proposition 1: 
Solving equations (1) and (2) yields the expression for the thresholds 𝜃! and 𝜃! as follows: 𝜃! = !!!! + !!! .                                                                                                                                          (A1) 𝜃! = !!!!!!!!!! + !!!!!! .                                                                                                                              (A2) 
 
Substituting the expression for 𝜃! and 𝜃! in the payoff function (3), the first order conditions with respect 
to 𝑃! and 𝑃! can expressed as follows: !! ! !!!!!!! !!!!! + !!!!!!! !! + !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! ! !!!!!!!!!! = 0.                                                                         (A3) − !!!!!!!!!! !! + !!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! .                                                                                                            (A4) 
 
Solving equations (A3) and (A4) yields the optimal prices under pure versioning as reported in 
Proposition 1. 
The equilibrium with pure versioning exists only when 𝑃! < 𝑃! and 𝜃! < 𝜃! < 𝜃!. Substituting 
the optimal prices and solving the inequality 𝑃! < 𝑃! yields a lower bound on the range of parameter 
values that support the equilibrium.  
 
Proof of Lemma 1: 
Substituting 𝜃! and 𝜃! from (A1) and (A2) and 𝜃! from (7), in the second stage payoff function given in 
(5) yields an optimization in one variable 𝑃!. The first order condition with respect to 𝑃! can be 
expressed as follows: !!! !!! !!!!!!!! + !!!!!!!!!! !! + (!!!!!!!)!(!!!!!!!)! (!!!!!)(!!!!!!!)!!!!!! .                                                                             (A4) 
Solving (A4) yields the optimal price 𝑃! as a function of 𝑃! and 𝑃! in (8).  
Substituting 𝑃! from (8), the second stage optimal profits can be expressed as a function of 𝑃! and 𝑃! as 
follows: 𝜋!∗ = ! ! !!!!! !!!!!!!!!(!!!!!!!)(!!!!!) 𝑃! − 𝑃! + !!!!!!!! + 𝜃!𝑃! − 𝑃! − 𝑃! !!!!!! + !!!!!!!!!! − 𝑃! !!!! + !!! .         (A5) 
Substituting (A5) back in the first stage payoff function (16) yields a maximization problem in 𝑃! and 𝑃!. 
The first order conditions with respect to 𝑃! and 𝑃! can be expressed as follows: 
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−2𝑃! !!!!!! + !!! + !!!!!!!! − !!! + !!!!!! + !!!!!!! !!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!! !!!!!! !!!!!!! !! = 0.                 (A6) 𝜃! − ! !!!!!!!!!! − !!!!!! + !! !!!!! ! !!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!! !!!!!!! = 0.                                                      (A7) 
 
Solving the first order conditions yields the optimal first period prices for the basic and premium versions 
as follows: 𝑃! = !! 𝑣! 2𝜃! − 𝑣! .                                                                                                                            (A8) 𝑃! = !!! !!!!! !!!!!! !!!!! !!!!! !!!! !!!!!!!(!!! !!!!! ) .                                                                            (A9) 
To derive the equilibrium we assumed that 𝑃! > 𝑃! + 𝑃!. In order to obtain the segmentation described 
in Fig 2 at the equilibrium, we require !!! < 𝜃! and 𝜃! < 𝜃!. In addition, we also need the condition 0 < 𝜃! < 𝜃! < 𝜃!, to support versioning in the first period.  
Substituting the optimal prices form (8), (A8) and (A9),  
(i) 𝑃! > 𝑃! + 𝑃! holds when 𝜃! > !!!!!!   and 0 < !!!!!! < !! !!!!! !!!!!!!!! . 
(ii)  𝜃! < 𝜃! is true when 𝑣! > 2𝜃! or (𝑣! > 2𝜃!    and 0 < !!!!!! < !!!!!!!!!).  !!! < 𝜃! is always true in the range of parameter values that support the above two conditions. 
Combining (i) and (ii) yields the regions of parameter values that support this equilibrium as described in 
Lemma 1.  
Lemma 2 and Lemma 3 can be derived using a similar approach.  
Proof of Proposition 2: 
The region of parameter values that support case (i) and case (iii) overlap when: 𝜃! > !!!!!!  and 0 < !!!!!! < !!!!!!"!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!! .  
Comparing the overall profits that the monopolist can achieve in case (i) and case (iii), we can express the 
difference in profits as follows: 𝜋!"#$(!) − 𝜋!"#$ !!! = ! !!!!! !!!!! !!" !!!!!!! !! > 0. 
We can therefore, eliminate case (iii) and compare case (i) and (ii) in the region of parameter values that 
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support both cases.  
The region of parameter values that support case (i) and case (ii) overlap when: 
a) !!!!!! < 𝜃! < !!!!!!!  and !!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! < !!!!!! < !! !!!!! !!!!!!!!!  or, 
b) !!!!!!! < 𝜃! < !! (2𝑣! + 3𝑣!) + !! 4𝑣!! + 8𝑣!𝑣! + 5𝑣!!  and !!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! < !!!!!! <!!!!!!!!!.  
Comparing the overall profits that the monopolist can achieve in case (i) and case (ii), we can express the 
difference in profits as follows: 𝜋!"#$(!) − 𝜋!"#$ !! = !! !!!!! !!! !!!!! !!! !!!!!! !!! !!!!!!!!"(!!!!!)(!!!!!!!!!)!! . 
𝜋!"#$(!) − 𝜋!"#$ !! > 0 when 0 < !!!!!! < !! !!!!!"!!!!(!!!!!!)!! !!!!! !!!!! .  
 
Comparing the upper bound on !!!!!! with the region where both case (i) and case (ii) exist:  
a)  
!! !!!!!"!!!!(!!!!!!)!! !!!!! !!!!! > !! !!!!! !!!!!!!!!  when 𝑣! > 3 − 5 𝜃! in which case 𝜋!"#$(!) >𝜋!"#$ !!  for all values of 𝑞.  
b) 
!! !!!!!"!!!!(!!!!!!)!! !!!!! !!!!! < !!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!  when 0 < 𝑣! < !"!!! 𝜃! and  
𝑣! < !!!!!!! !!!!! !!! !!!!!"!!!!!!!!! , in which case 𝜋!"#$(!) < 𝜋!"#$ !!  for all values of 𝑞.  
c) For intermediate values of 𝑣! and 𝑣!,   𝜋!"#$(!) > 𝜋!"#$ !!  when 
0 < !!!!!! < !! !!!!!"!!!!(!!!!!!)!! !!!!! !!!!! .  
Proof of Proposition 3: 
The proof for Proposition 3 directly follows from the proof of Lemma 1 and Lemma 2. 
Proof of Proposition 4: 
Comparing the price of new service under the DB and IP regimes: 
Case (i): 
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𝑃!!" = !!!!!!!!!!! < !!!! = 𝑃!!" .  𝑃!!" = 𝑃!!" = !! 𝑣! 2𝜃! − 𝑣! .  𝑃!!" − 𝑃!!" = ! !!!!! !!! !!! !!!!! > 0. 
Case (ii): 𝑃!!" = !!!!!!!! < !!!! = 𝑃!!". 𝑃!!" − 𝑃!!" = !!!!!!!!!!! > 0.  𝑃!!" − 𝑃!!" = !!!!!!!!!!! > 0. 
Proof of Proposition 5: 
Comparing the overall profits with discriminative bundling and independent pricing regimes, 
Case (i): 𝜋!" − 𝜋!" = − !!!!!!!! !!!!! < 0.  
Case (ii):  𝜋!" − 𝜋!" = − !!!!! !!!!! !!!!!!! !!!!! !!!!!!!!"(!!!!!)!! < 0.  
Proof of Proposition 6: 
(a) When 𝑞! < 𝑞!, the monopolist can either charge 𝑃! = 𝑞! and cover the entire market or charge 𝑃! = 𝑞! and sell the new service only to premium version subscribers.  
 
(i) 𝑃! = 𝑞!. 
The monopolist sells the new service to all consumers and the payoff function can be expressed as 
follows: 
𝜋 = 2 !!!! 𝑑𝜃(!!!!!)!!!!! !(!!!!!)!!!!!!!!! + !!!! 𝑑𝜃!!(!!!!!)!!!!! !(!!!!!)! + !!!! 𝑑𝜃!!! . 
The first order conditions with respect to 𝑃! and 𝑃! are the same as (A3) and (A4), which yields the 
same price for the basic and premium version as pure versioning.  
(ii) 𝑃! = 𝑞! 
The monopolist sells the new service only to the premium version customers and payoff function can 
be expressed as follows: 
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𝜋 = 2 !!!! 𝑑𝜃(!!!!!)!!!!! !(!!!!!)!!!!!!!!! + !!!! 𝑑𝜃!!(!!!!!)!!!!! !(!!!!!)! + !!!! 𝑑𝜃!!(!!!!!)!!!!! !(!!!!!)! . 
The first order conditions with respect to 𝑃! and 𝑃! can be expressed as follows: 2 !! ! !!!!!!! !!!!! + !!!!!!! !! + !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! ! !!!!!!!!!! + !!(!!!!!)!! = 0.                                      (A10) 
2 − !!!!!!!!!! !! + !!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! − !!!!!!! !! = 0.                                                                 (A11) 
Solving the above two equations yields the optimal prices as reported in Proposition 6. 
Comparing the overall profits in the above two cases, it is fairly straightforward to show that 𝑃! = 𝑞! 
leads to higher profits than 𝑃! = 𝑞! when 𝑞! > 𝑞! !!!!!!!!! !!!!! !!!!!!! .  
(b) When 𝑞! > 𝑞!, the monopolist can either charge 𝑃! = 𝑞! and cover the entire market or charge 𝑃! = 𝑞! and sell the new service only to non-premium version customers.   
 
(i) 𝑃! = 𝑞!. 
The monopolist sells the new service to all consumers and the payoff function can be expressed as 
follows: 
𝜋 = 2 !!!! 𝑑𝜃(!!!!!)!!!!! !(!!!!!)!!!!!!!!! + !!!! 𝑑𝜃!!(!!!!!)!!!!! !(!!!!!)! + !!!! 𝑑𝜃!!! . 
The first order conditions with respect to 𝑃! and 𝑃! are the same as (A3) and (A4), which yields the 
same price for the basic and premium version as pure versioning.  
(ii) 𝑃! = 𝑞!. 
The monopolist sells the new service only to the basic version customers and non-subscribers. The 
payoff function can be expressed as follows: 
𝜋 = 2 !!!! 𝑑𝜃(!!!!!)!!!!! !(!!!!!)!!!!!!!!! + !!!! 𝑑𝜃!!(!!!!!)!!!!! !(!!!!!)! + !!!! 𝑑𝜃
(!!!!!)!!!!! !(!!!!!)!! . 
The first order conditions with respect to 𝑃! and 𝑃! can be expressed as follows: 2 !! ! !!!!!!! !!!!! + !!!!!!! !! + !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! ! !!!!!!!!!! − !!(!!!!!)!! = 0.                                     (A12) 
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2 − !!!!!!!!!! !! + !!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! + !!!!!!! !! = 0.                                                                (A13) 
Solving the above two equations yields the optimal prices as reported in Proposition 6.  
Similar to (a), it is fairly straightforward to show that, 𝑃! = 𝑞! leads to higher profits than 𝑃! = 𝑞! when 𝑞! > 𝑞! !!!!!!!!! !!!!! !!!!!!! . 
Proof of Proposition 7: 
Assuming, 𝑃! > 𝑃! + 𝑃!, the second stage optimization problem is as given in (5).  
While 𝜃! and 𝜃! are inherited from the first period, the threshold 𝜃! can be derived by solving the 
following utility equation: 𝜃!𝑣! − !!!! + 𝑞! − 𝑃! − 𝑃! = 𝜃!𝑣! − !!!! + 𝑞! − 𝑃!.                                                                         (A14) 
The solution to (A14) yields 𝜃! = (!!!!!)! + (!!!!!)!!!!! + (!!!!!!!!)!!!!! .  
Since all consumers in the interval 0, 𝜃!  have the same valuation 𝑞! for the new service, the optimal 
price for the new service when sold separately, 𝑃! = 𝑞!.  
The second period payoff function can therefore, be expresses as a function of 𝑃! and 𝑃! as follows: 
𝜋! = − !!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!! !! + ! !!!!! !!!!! !!!!!!! !!!!!!! !!!!! ! !!!!! !!!!!!! !!!!!!! !!!!! !! .              (A15) 
Substituting 𝜋!  from (A15) in the first period payoff function given in (16) yields the overall profit with 
horizontal differentiation.  
The first order conditions with respect to 𝑃! and 𝑃! can be derived as follows: −2𝑃! !!!!!! + !!! + !!!!!!!! + 𝑣! − !!!!!!!!!! + ! !!!!!!!!!!!!!! !! = 0.                                                       (A16) 2𝜃! − 4 !!!!!!!!!! − 𝑣! + 𝑣! + !!!!!!!!!! = 0.                                                                                       (A17) 
Solving equations (A16) and (A17) yields the optimal prices as reported in Proposition 7. 
We assumed that 𝑃! > 𝑃! + 𝑞! in deriving the equilibrium and 0 < 𝜃! < 𝜃! < 𝜃! < 𝜃! is required to 
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support versioning in the first period and second periods. 
Substituting the optimal prices and solving the inequalities yields the region of parameter values that 
support this equilibrium as described in Proposition 7.  
Proof of Proposition 8: 
Comparing the profits with DB and IP, we can express the difference in profits as follows: 
a)  𝑞! < 𝑞! 
When 𝑞! > 𝑞! !!!!!!!!! !!!!! !!!!!!! . 𝜋!" − 𝜋!" = ! !!!!!!! !!"!!!!!! !!!!! !!!!!!!!!!! !!!! !!!!!!! !!!!!! !!!!! !!!!!! !!!!!!" !!!!! !! . 
The expression on the right-hand side is positive when the following condition holds:  
𝑞! > !! 5𝑞! + 2 𝑣!! − 𝑣!! − 4𝜃! 𝑣! − 𝑣! + 16𝑞!! + 8𝑞! 𝑣! − 𝑣! 𝑣! + 𝑣! − 2𝜃! + A .           (A18) 
Where A ≡ (𝑣! − 𝑣!)(7𝑣!! + 7𝑣!!𝑣! − 7𝑣!𝑣!! − 4vl! − 4𝜃!(7𝑣!! − 4𝑣!! − 7𝑣!𝜃! + 4𝑣!𝜃!) 
However, in the region of parameter values that support the DB regime, (A18) is true only when: 
𝜃! > 6𝑣𝐻2−7𝑣𝐿2+𝑣𝐻 3𝑣𝐿 !!!!!22(6𝑣𝐻−7𝑣𝐿) . 
When 𝑞! < 𝑞! !!!!!!!!! !!!!! !!!!!!! .  
 𝜋!" − 𝜋!" =!!!!!!!! !!"!!!!!! !!!!! !!!!!!!!!!! !!!!! !!!! !!!!!!! !!!!!! !!!!! !!!!!! !!!!!!" !!!!! !! . 
The expression on the right-hand side is positive when the following condition holds: 𝑞! >5𝑞! + √(22𝑞!! − 4𝑞! 𝑣! − 𝑣! 𝑣! + 𝑣! − 2𝜃! + 𝑣!! 𝑣!! − 𝑣!! − 𝑣!𝑣!! 𝑣! − 𝑣! + 4𝑣!𝜃! 𝑣! 𝑣! +𝑣! + 𝜃! 𝑣! − 𝑣! .                                                                                                          (A19) 
However, in the region of parameter values that support the DB regime, (A19) is true only when: 
𝜃! > 5!!2−3𝑣𝐿22(!!+𝑣𝐿) − 𝑣𝐻−𝑣𝐿 8!!3−!!2𝑣𝐿−16!!𝑣𝐿2−8𝑣𝐿32(!!+𝑣𝐿)2 . 
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b)   𝑞! > 𝑞!  
When 𝑞! > 𝑞! !!!!!!!!! !!!!! !!!!!!! . 𝜋!" − 𝜋!" = ! !!!!!!! !!"!!!!!! !!!!! !!!!!!!!!!! !!!! !!!!!!! !!!!!! !!!!! !!!!!! !!!!!!" !!!!! !! . 
The expression on the right-hand side is positive when the following condition holds: 
𝑞! > !! 5𝑞! − 2 𝑣!! − 𝑣!! − 4𝜃! 𝑣! − 𝑣! + 16𝑞!! − 8𝑞! 𝑣! − 𝑣! 𝑣! + 𝑣! + 2𝜃! + B .            (A20) 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒  𝐵 ≡ (𝑣! − 𝑣!)(7𝑣!! + 7𝑣!!𝑣! − 7𝑣!𝑣!! − 4𝑣!! − 4𝜃!(𝑣!! − 4𝑣!! + 7𝑣!𝜃! − 4𝑣!𝜃!). 
However, in the region of parameter values that support the DB regime, (A20) is true only when: 
𝜃! > − 2𝑣𝐻2+𝑣𝐿22(2𝑣𝐻−5𝑣𝐿)− 𝑣𝐻−𝑣𝐿 (8𝑣𝐻3−𝑣𝐻2𝑣𝐿−20𝑣𝐻𝑣𝐿2−8𝑣𝐿3)2(2𝑣𝐻−5𝑣𝐿)2 . 
When 𝑞! < 𝑞! !!!!!!!!! !!!!! !!!!!!! . 𝜋!" − 𝜋!" = !!!!!!!! !!"!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!! !!!!! !!!! !!!!!!! !!!!!! !!!!! !!!!!! !!!!!!" !!!!! !! .  
The expression on the right-hand side is positive when the following condition holds: 𝑞! > 5𝑞! + √(22𝑞!! + 4𝑞! 𝑣! − 𝑣! 𝑣! + 𝑣! − 2𝜃! + 𝑣!! 𝑣!! − 𝑣!! − 𝑣!𝑣!! 𝑣! − 𝑣! − 4𝑣!𝜃! 𝑣! −𝑣! 𝑣! − 𝜃! .                                                                                                                        (A21) 
However, (A21) is not true in the region of parameter values that support the DB regime. 
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